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JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY:
A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
PATRICK J. MONAHANt

There are two deep and central puzzles which confront Canadian
jurists as they struggle to make sense of the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms' and its meaning for Canadian legal and political culture.
The puzzles, although not identical, are closely interrelated. The
first is the recurring riddle which has haunted American constitutionalists for the past twenty-five years. It arises from the apparent
contradiction between democratic values and the institution of
judicial review. Judicial review involves unelected judges overturning the will of a democratically-accountable legislature on the basis
of open-ended and abstract constitutional guarantees. The interpretation and application of those guarantees necessarily requires the
exercise of wide discretion on the part of the judiciary. A continuing
puzzle for American theorists has been how to account for and
justify this apparent derogation from democratic principles.
Despite the vast amounts of attention and energy devoted to this
enterprise over the past generation, American theorists appear no
closer to discovering a solution today than they were when Herbert
Wechsler delivered his famous Holmes lecture in 19592 For some,
the "historic obsession of normative constitutional law scholarship"

1" Of the Osgoode Hall Law School. This essay is part of a larger work,

Politics and the Constitution: The Charter, Federalism and the Supreme
Court of Canada, to be published by Carswell in 1987. The author received
helpful comments and criticisms on the paper from numerous readers, but
owes a special debt to a former colleague, Andrew Petter, now of the University of Victoria. Andrew has been a constant and vital source of advice,
encouragement and, most importantly, friendship, throughout the work on

this essay.
) Patrick J. Monahan, 1987.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1992, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. i i [hereinafter Charter].
2 "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959) 73 Harv. L.
Rev. i.
1
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is now thought to be "essentially incoherent and unresolvable".8
This has prompted a number of leading writers to declare that it is
fruitless and counterproductive to search for "the principle" which
legitimizes judicial review. For these theorists, there is no such
Archimedean point awaiting discovery. Constitutionalism should
descend from the mount of grand theory and focus on more prosaic
issues arising from the interpretation and application of particular
constitutional provisions.4
With the enactment of the Charter,Canadian lawyers and judges
will now have to grapple with this fundamental issue of legitimacy.
There is also a second, related problem arising from the introduction
of the Charter, one that is particular to Canadian legal culture. One
of the central components of Canada's legal creed has been a belief
in the continued viability of the distinction between the realms of
law and politics.5 The cornerstone of this creed has been the legislative supremacy of Parliament, subject only to federalism issues dealing with the proper allocation of power. The role of the courts has
been regarded as essentially subordinate; the courts do not make
political choices themselves, but merely give effect to the political
choices made by others. The Charter challenges the dominance of
this ruling paradigm. The interpretation of the vague language of
the Charter appears to require the courts to make political choices
of their own, rather than simply deferring to the choices of others.
The Chartersuggests the possibility of a new paradigm, one in which
the judiciary will assume central and equal responsibility for the
development of public policy in Canada. The difficulty for Canada's
lawyers and judges is how to reconcile this emerging reality under
the Charterwith their traditional assumptions regarding the proper
scope of the judicial role.
This paper is a preliminary attempt to come to terms with these
central issues posed by the Charter. My argument begins with the
proposition that traditional assumptions about the dichotomy between legal and political reasoning cannot be maintained in the
context of the Charter. My argument does not depend simply on
the inexact language employed in the definition of the various subs

P. Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship" (198i) 90 Yale L.J. io63.

4 For expression of views along these lines, see L. Tribe, Constitutional Choices
(0985) at iff; P. Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (1982) at 237.
5 See Gold, "The Charter of Rights and the Amending Formula" (1983) [unpublished]; P. Monahan, "At Doctrine's Twilight: The Structure of Canadian Federalism" (1984) 34 U. of T.L.J. 47.
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stantive rights. More particularly, the political character of Charter
adjudication is implicit in the very structure of the analysis contemplated under s.I. The "balancing of interests" analysis is just another
way of asking the fundamental legislative question: "is this worth
what it costs?" In answering this question, the courts will have to
develop a substantive theory of the nature of freedom and democracy, in order to determine the limits on rights which "can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". Charter
analysis is explicitly normative. It requires courts to assess the content of legislation against some background theory of rights, freedom
and democracy. There is nothing distinctively "legal" about such an
enterprise.
But the political, value-laden character of Charter analysis is the
starting point rather than the conclusion of my argument. The far
more meaningful issue is identifying those substantive values and
arguments which should guide judges and lawyers in their application of the Charter. The claim which I defend is premised on a
distinction between substantive outcomes of the political process and
the fairness of that process itself. In my view, the judiciary should
not undertake the task of testing the substantive outcomes of the
political process against some theory of the right or the good. The
resolution of Charterissues is not to be found in the philosophies of
John Rawls, Robert Nozick or Ronald Dworkin. Rather, the central focus of judicial review should be the integrity of the political
process itself. The judiciary should interpret constitutional guarantees in such a way that the opportunities for public debate and collective deliberation are enhanced. To put the matter simply,
constitutional adjudication should be in the name of democracy,
rather than right answers.
Readers familiar with the American literature will recognize the
similarity between this argument and the work of John Hart Ely.
In Democracy and Distrust, Dean Ely argues that judicial review is
designed to ensure that the political process is open to those of all
viewpoints on something approaching an equal basis. Ely's work
has been the subject of intense and often effective criticism amongst
American constitutional theorists.' The critics have relentlessly attacked the central distinction between procedure and substance,
6 J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (i98o).
7

See, for example: R. Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle", in A Matter of
Principle (985)
at 33; L. Tribe, "The Puzzling Persistence of ProcessBased Constitutional Theories" (Ig8o) 89 Yale L.J. io63.
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which forms the underpinnings of Ely's argument. The main point
made by the critics is that Ely's so-called "process-oriented" theory
itself requires judges to make substantive value choices. The problem is that Ely regards the making of substantive value choices by
judges as illegitimate. Thus his theory seems to require the judiciary
to make just the sorts of value choices which he considers off-limits;
in short, the theory is hopelessly and inevitably self-contradictory.
It may well be that Dean Ely's theory of judicial review under the
American Constitution is unpersuasive. But the fundamental shortcomings of the theory are not those identified by Ely's critics. In my
view, the fundamental problem with Dean Ely's analysis has very
little to do with questions of "internal logic" and everything to do
with the basic purposes underlying the American Constitution. It is
simply implausible to regard the provisions of the American Constitution as being directed exclusively towards the enhancement of
democratic values. This critique of Ely's theory, since it focuses on
the "fit" between the theory and the terms of the American Constitution, leaves open the possibility that Ely's basic approach may well
be relevant and persuasive in another context. Turning to an analysis
of the Canadian Charter,I attempt to identify both the similarities
and the differences between the Charterand the U.S. Bill of Rights.
What is apparent is that the drafters of the Charter either rejected
or modified many of the elements found in the American Bill of
Rights. Significantly, the elements of the American experience which
were rejected or modified by Canadian drafters were those constitutional provisions which required judges to vindicate particular substantive values. Those features of the American Constitution which
required judges to police the integrity of the political process were
imported, largely unchanged, into the Canadian Charter.
This leads me to conclusions which may appear somewhat counter-intuitive or paradoxical. My claim is that the representationreinforcing theory of judicial review, although originally formulated
in the American context, actually offers a far more convincing account of the purposes underlying the Canadian Charter. My claim
is that the drafters of the Canadian Charterembraced those elements
of the American Constitution designed to protect the democratic
process, while largely excluding provisions aimed at guaranteeing
particular substantive goods or values deemed fundamental. In short,
judicial review in Canada ought to serve much more limited and
circumscribed purposes than judicial review under the American
Bill of Rights. A shorthand way of describing those purposes would
be to say that the Charter is mostly concerned with the proper func-
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tioning of democratic politics as opposed to the substantive outcomes of the process.
The argument falls into three distinct parts, each comprising a
section of the paper. The first section points out the extent to which
legal analysis under the Charter will be explicitly normative. Reviewing the early Supreme Court opinions under the Charter, I
argue that the political character of Charter choices has thrown the
Court into considerable confusion over its role. This confusion has
manifested itself in two conflicting tendencies which run through
the early cases. On the one hand, the Court has been very anxious
to escape the legacy of narrow and technical interpretation which
characterized its jurisprudence under the CanadianBill of Rights.8
It has emphasized that the Charter is a fundamental constitutional
document as opposed to a mere statute and that it must receive a
large and liberal construction by the courts. At the same time, the
Court has asserted that the Charter does not disturb the traditional
barrier between law and politics. A "large and liberal" interpretation
of the Charterdoes not require the Court to make political choices
because the Court is concerned only with the legality of legislation
and not its wisdom. The problem is that the Court has yet to explain
how issues of legality under the Charter can be resolved without an
inquiry into the wisdom of legislative choices. Instead of argument, the Court in these early cases has adopted a strategy of confession and avoidance. The opinions have tended to avoid "balancing
of interests" under section i while appearing to resolve disputes
through resort to categorical, nondiscretionary rules.
The second section of the paper examines two important arguments which might be thought to resolve this fundamental tension
regarding the nature of the judicial role. Both arguments are drawn
from the American literature on judicial review. The first claims
that the judiciary can deal with the indeterminacy of constitutional
language through an appeal to the intentions of the drafters. By
paying close attention to the purposes and thoughts of those who
wrote the Constitution, the judiciary can discover rather than create
constitutional meaning. This theory of "original intent" has particular importance for Canada, since we have an extensive legislative
record of the intentions of the drafters of the Canadian constitution.
But after examining the normative implications of the theory, I conclude that the substantive intentions of the drafters can offer only
s CanadianBill of Rights, R.S.C. 197o, App. III.
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limited guidance in resolving interpretive problems arising under
the Charter.
This section of the paper goes on to consider another prominent
American theory of judicial review. On this view, the judiciary
should develop a theory of substantive individual rights based on
the idea of what it might mean to recognize in another man or woman the special qualities of moral agency and personality. The
judiciary should then test the substantive fairness of the outcomes of
the political process against the measuring rod of the idea of personhood. I reject this theory, for two reasons. First, it seeks to arbitrate
conflict through appeal to an elite judiciary rather than through
collective debate and argument. It proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the point of democracy is to devise correct philosophical
answers to moral problems. Second, the theory proceeds on the basis
of an individualistic conception of the relationship between individual
and community. This individualistic ideology may or may not be
appropriate in the American context, but it is incompatible with the
rich and heterogeneous traditions of Canadian politics.
The final section of the paper asks whether the proper role of the
judiciary under the Charter cannot be derived from the idea of
democracy itself. I argue that the basic democratic principle, the
notion that the exercise of power should be subject to collective
debate and deliberation, is an extremely powerful critical tool. I
claim that the deep critical power of these ideas should be brought
to bear on the political process itself as opposed to the outcomes of
that process. The argument does not depend on a false dichotomy
between substance and procedure. The approach to judicial review
which I defend is every bit as substantive as the arguments of any
"fundamental rights" theorist. The difference is that judicial review
performed in the name of democracy seeks to enhance the integrity
of the political process rather than bypass that process in the name of
right answers. It places a premium on the democratic community
struggling and searching for its collective identity. Most importantly,
it is an analysis which reflects not only the structure of the Charter
itself but also the larger Canadian political tradition.
There is a preliminary but very fundamental objection which
might be raised against the analysis advanced in this paper. This
objection is that any discussion of the legitimacy of judicial review
is simply misplaced in the Canadian context. According to this objection, the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review is a peculiarly American phenomenon which simply does not arise in relation
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to the Charter. This attempt to sidestep the legitimacy debate in
Canada is exemplified by the judgment of Lamer J. in the Motor
Vehicle Act Reference.'
Mr. Justice Lamer offers a variety of arguments as to why the
legitimacy of judicial review is a nonissue for Canadian jurists. First,
he points out that the drafters of the Charter were well aware of
what they were doing when they enacted this document into law in
1982. The very point of enacting the Charterwas to confer on judges
the power to strike down statutes. Thus it would be illogical and
ahistorical to claim that when judges interpret and apply the Charter
they are acting illegitimately; the judiciary is simply discharging the
duty which was inherent in the enactment of the Constitution Act,
1982.1" Second, he claims that judicial review acquires legitimacy
due to the objectivity and neutrality of the process of Charterinterpretation. Mr. Justice Lamer emphasizes that the Court's role is
simply to interpret and apply the objective and neutral standards
contained in the Constitution. The Court need not inquire into the
wisdom of legislation, nor do judges substitute their values for those
of the legislature in resolving constitutional claims. The question of
the constitutional validity of legislation is totally separate and distinct from the question of the wisdom or merits of that legislation.
In my view, this second argument about wisdom is simply
wrong. One of the primary claims which I advance in the first section of this article is that judges are inevitably required to assess the
policy underlying legislation in order to measure that legislation
against the Charter.What of the first argument regarding legitimacy
the claim that the whole legitimacy debate is essentially an inhouse American dispute which has no relevance for the Canadian
Charter? This argument is based on the fact that, whereas the
American Constitution does not explicitly provide for the power of
judicial review, in Canada such power was explicitly contemplated
by s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Thus, while there may be
some residual doubt over the legitimacy of judicial review in the
American context, such questions simply do not arise in Canada.
This defence of the legitimacy of judicial review is misleading and
oversimplified. Of course, it is true that the American Constitution
Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. I979, C. 288
as am. Motor Vehicle Act S.B.C. 1982 [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 492, 24 D.L.R.

o Reference re.

(4th) 536 [hereinafter Motor Vehicle Act Reference].

10 Being Schedule B of the Canada Act r982 (U.K.), 1982, C. II [hereinafter

Constitution Act, z982].
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does not explicitly provide for judicial review and that the institution
owes its existence to Marshall C.J.'s opinion in Marbury v. Madison." But the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review in
America over the past quarter century has certainly not centred
over the merits of Marbury. There are no prominent contemporary
American theorists calling for the abolition of the institution of
judicial review. The debate is not over judical review per se, but
rather over what type of judicial review can be justified in a democratic polity. In essence, the contemporary debate is between some
form of "textualism", which seeks to constrain judges through an
objective theory of interpretation, and "noninterpretivism", which
suggests that judges may look to values outside the text in order to
give meaning to the Constitution.
It is apparent that precisely the same issues inevitably arise in the
context of the Canadian Charter. The issue of legitimacy does not
centre on whether to have judicial review at all; this "big question"
was settled in 1982. What the Charter'senactment did not resolve
was the subsidiary and more narrow issue of whether there are inherent limits to judicial review in the Canadian context. Once it is
acknowledged that such limits exist, then the issue of legitimacy is
joined. The very act of defining the limitations of judicial review
requires the identification of those forms of judicial review which
fall outside of the limits and are therefore inappropriate or illegitimate.
As noted above, the Supreme Court itself has repeated on many
occasions that its role under the Charteris a limited one. The Court
believes that its duty is to objectively apply the text of the Constitution and not assess the wisdom of legislation. Thus, while the Court
has sought to deny the relevance of the legitimacy debate, its own
analysis makes such a debate unavoidable. By elaborating a particular conception of its role, the Court has begun the task of defining
the forms of judicial review which are legitimate and those which
are illegitimate. The inevitability of such a debate does not mean
that the specific contours of the Canadian debate should simply
mimic developments in the United States. Canadians may arrive at
quite distinctive and indigenous conclusions over the appropriate
function of judicial review. The point is simply that some form of
legitimacy debate is both necessary and desirable in Canada. This
paper attempts to offer a framework for the conduct of that debate.

11

(1803) 5 U.S. 537-
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II. THE EARLY CHARTER CASES IN THE SUPREME
COURT
A. The Conflicting Tendencies
With only a handful of Charter cases decided by the Supreme
Court by early 1986, it is obviously difficult to hazard any generalizations regarding the Court's performance or attitude towards the
Charter,let alone speculate about future developments. Yet even at
this early stage, it is possible to identify at least two important and
somewhat conflicting trends in the cases. These tendencies suggest
that the Court has a deep ambivalence towards its new responsibities under the Charterand that there are strong impulses pulling the
Court in opposite directions.
One tendency in these early cases, which is the most obvious and
therefore uncontroversial, is that the Court seems intent on adopting
a fundamentally different attitude towards Charterlitigation than it
did towards cases arising under the Canadian Bill of Rights. The
judicial legacy under the Bill of Rights was one of endless logical
and legal posturing, apparently designed to ensure that the statute's
only application would be to laws dealing with the drunkenness of
Indians, off of reserves, in the Northwest Territories."2 Such transparent contortions have apparently become passi for purposes of
Charter litigation. Not only has the Court granted relief in about
tvo-thirds of the Chartercases decided thus far, 3 its judgments have
been robed in the rhetoric of activist judicial review. We have been
12 R. v. Drybones [1970] S.C.R. 282, 6o W.W.R. 321; Lavell v. Attorney General of Canada [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 22 D.L.R. (3d) 182; Bliss v. Attorney
General of Canada [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 711.
13 The cases in which the Charter challenge succeeded are: Trask v. The
Queen [1985] i S.C.R. 655, i9 D.L.R. (4th) 123; Rahn v. The Queen
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 659, 19 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 126; R. v. Therens [1985] 1 S.C.R.
613, r8 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 655; Singh v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1985] x S.C.R. 177, 17 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 422; Hunter, Director of Investigations and Research, Combines Investigation Branch v. Southam Inc. [1984]
2 S.C.R. 145, i1 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 641; R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. [1985] 1
S.C.R. 295, x8 D.L.R. (4th) 321; Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec
Assoc. of ProtestantSchool Boards [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66, 1o D.L.R. ( 4 th) 321 ;
Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra, note 9; R. v. Oakes, infra, note 43;
Dubois v. The Queen [1985] 2 S.O.R. 350, 23 D.L.R. ( 4 th) 503; R. v.
Clarkson [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383, 50 N.BR. 226. The cases in which the claim
failed are: Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen, infra, note 16; Law
Society of Upper Canadav. Skapinker, infra, note 14; Spencer v. La Reine
[1985] I S.C.R. 278, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 344; R. v. Valente [19851 2 S.C.R.
673, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 452; Societ des Acadiens Brunswick v. Assoc. of
Parents for Fairness in Education [x986] 1 S.C.R. 549, 50 N.B.R. (2d) 41
[hereinafter Societ6 des Acadiens]; R. v. Krug [1985] 2 S.C.R. 255, 5i N.R.

32on.
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told that the Charter is a "living tree" that must not be contaminated by narrow or technical judicial interpretation. The Court in
Chartercases should not merely engage in ordinary statutory construction, but must perform a "constitutional role"." The Court has
seen the banner of U.S. Chief Justice Marshall being run up the
Canadian legal flagpole and it has saluted: "we must never forget
that it is a constitution [emphasis added] that we are interpreting." 5
The second tendency in these early Chartercases flows from and,
to some extent, qualifies the first. Despite the incessant invocation
of activist rhetoric, the Court has stoutly maintained that its role

under the Charteris legal and not political. The Court's concern is
not with the wisdom of legislation, but only with the separate question of whether a right guaranteed by the Charterhas been violated.
Madame Justice Wilson forcefully emphasized this point in her
concurring opinion in the Operation Dismantle case: "The question
before us is not whether the government's defence policy is sound
but whether or not it violates the appellant's rights under s. 7 of the
CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms. This is a totally different question [emphasis added]. I do not think there can be any
doubt that this is a question for the courts."'"
Of course, this statement is only meaningful if the issue of legality
can be determined without recourse to questions of wisdom. Madame
Justice Wilson's confident assertion that the issues are "totally different" seems based on the fact that the Court is being called on to
interpret and apply a specific legal standard, in this case s. 7 of the
Charter.But the mere fact that statutory language is involved does
not, in itself, provide a distinction between legal and political questions. The issue is whether it is possible to apply the statutory language without an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislation under
review.
Even a cursory analysis of the language and structure of the
Charterindicates that most Charterlitigation may well turn on the
issue of the wisdom of legislative choices. In part, this is a product
of the abstract and generalized nature of the rights protected by the
Charter.The very process of defining the content of the rights protected by the Charterseems inherently political. Many of these rights,
14 Law Society of Upper Canada v. Skapinker [x984] x S.C.R. 357, 9 D.L.R.

(4th) 16x at 168 per Estey J.

15 M'Culloch v. State of Maryland (i819) 17 U.S. 316, cited by Estey J. in
Skapinker, ibid. at 170.
16 Operation Dismantle Inc. v. The Queen [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441 at 472, 18

D.L.R. (4th) 48!.
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most notably the right to equality and liberty, contain little or no
substantive criteria; they resemble blank slates on which the judiciary can scrawl the imagery of their choice. But there is a second
problem. Having given content to these open-ended rights, the judiciary must then balance these rights against considerations of the
general welfare under s. i. This process of interest balancing seems
just another way of asking the fundamental legislative question: "is
this worth what it costs?" The process of balancing individual against
collective interests is a calculation which would have already been
made by the legislature when it passed the statute under review.
Since the legislature passed the statute, it must have calculated that
the interests to be served outweigh those to be sacrificed. Section i of
the Charter appears to invite the Court to assess and second-guess
the wisdom of the balance struck by the legislature.
There is no reason to suppose that the Court is better situated
than the legislature to make such judgments. Balancing of interests
is a quintessentially legislative task. 7 We normally look to the political rather than the legal branches of government for calculations of
general welfare. Only the legislature is equipped to deal with the
vast array of data that is relevant to such an inquiry. Not only do
the courts lack the expertise and the resources to consider these legislative facts, the litigants in a private lawsuit are unlikely to place
them on the record. This is why even the most ardent defenders of
judicial review concede that interpersonal comparisons of utility are
best carried out by the legislature: "[t]he political system of representative democracy may work only indifferently ... , but it works

better than a system that allows nonelected judges, who have no
mail bag or lobbyists or pressure groups, to compromise competing
interests in their chambers."' 8
The highly politicized nature of the s. i inquiry is merely exacerbated by the reference to "reasonable limits" that can be "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society". In order to give
content to this terminology, the courts will have to devise some
normative theory about the nature of freedom and of democracy.
The trouble with this is twofold. First, there is no fixed or uncontroThere was an ongoing American debate in the ig6os over whether "interest
balancing" was an appropriate task for the judiciary. The weight of opinion
tended to the view that it was inappropriate, since it required the court to
perform legislative tasks. For a sampling of the various viewpoints, see L.
Frantz, "The First Amendment in the Balance" (1962) 7 Yale L.J. 1424;
W. Mendelson, "On the Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the
Balance" (1962) 50 Cal. L. Rev. 821.
18 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 85.
17
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versial core meaning to these concepts; they are contested concepts,
with a rich and sophisticated debate continuing within political
theory over their content and application. 9 Second, the judiciary is
largely unaware of the nature and subtlety of these theoretical
debates; legal training in Canada has always relegated such political
questions to the domain of the academy or the legislature rather than
the courtroom. The enactment of the Charteris like an unscheduled

"night drop", in which Canada's judges and lawyers have been
parachuted unaware into the battlefields of political theory, without
weapons, and with no knowledge of the deployment of the contending armies.
In an attempt to avoid this unpleasant scenario, some of the early
Charter cases have suggested that the reference to "free and democratic societies" in s. i directs judges to engage in a comparative
inquiry. According to this view, the court must look to practices in
other "free and democratic" societies and determine the limits on
rights which are acceptable there. Limitations which are generally
accepted in such free and democratic societies are justifiable according to the terms of s. i If this analysis were correct, the court
would be relieved of the responsibility of determining for itself the
nature of freedom or of democracy. The court would be a mere
cataloguer rather than a lofty theorist, taking judicial notice of the
balance that others have struck between individual rights and collective welfare. The s. i analysis would be largely descriptive rather
than overtly normative.
The mistake in this analysis is as common as it is fundamental.
The reasoning attempts to leap from the fact that a state of affairs
exists to the inference that this state is justified. But a moment's reflection will indicate why this leap from the descriptive to the
normative cannot succeed. To take a well-known example, blacks in
the United States have been subjected to various forms of institutionalized and informal discrimination over the past two hundred
."

years. In particular, the education system prior to the 1950s was

segregated along racial lines, in keeping with the "separate but
19
20

For a survey of some of the recent debates over the meaning of democracy,
see C. Pateman, Participationand Democratic Theory (1970).
For instances of this line of argument see: Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors, (1983) 147 D.L.R. (3d)
58, 41 O.R. (2d) 583 (H.C.); Federal Republic of Germany v. Rauca
(1982) x41 D.L.R. (3d) 42 (Ont. H.C.); The Rt. Honourable D. MacDonald, Legal Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: A
Manual of Issues and Sources (1982) at 18.
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equal" doctrine sanctioned in Plessy.21 When the Supreme Court of
the United States came to reconsider the constitutionality of separate
schooling in the famous case of Brown v. Board of Education" the
mere fact that such segregation existed could not count as a constitutional justification in its favour. Constitutional argument is normative; it is about what ought to be, not about what is. The opponents
of segregation did not question the fact that such segregation had
existed; their point was precisely that the very existence of separate
facilities perpetuated racial stereotypes and ensured the continued
subjugation of American blacks. Historical or comparative arguments pointing to widespread acceptance of such racial segregation
were simply irrelevant in this normative equation. If the state was
to justify separate facilities, it had to rely on the inherent desirability
of the system, not its pervasiveness.
A similar sort of argument applies in the context of s. i. If, for
example, the Court is hearing a s. 15 challenge to restrictions on
combat roles for women in the military, the fact that other nations
have seen fit to impose similar restrictions cannot count as a significant reason in their favour. This comparative evidence may be relevant as an indication of the extent to which sexual stereotypes are
deeply embedded in the consciousness of liberal democracies. But it
tells us nothing about whether or not these restrictioris on women
satisfy some independent norm of equality. To answer that question,
the Court will have to devise its own conception of equality and
balance it against the interests of the community as a whole.
So we begin with this general premise: the process whereby the
Court defines rights and then balances them against considerations
of general welfare bears a striking resemblance to legislative judgments about general utility. The question under s. i of the Charter
- whether gains in general welfare justify limits on individual rights
appears no different in principle from the question the legislature asks itself when it enacts legislation. Moreover, the concepts of
"freedom" and "democracy" referred to in s. i are themselves indeterminate and fundamentally contested. Rather than offer any
meaningful weights and measures for use in the balancing process,
they merely invite the Court to devise its own theory of freedom and
democracy.
This returns me to my original observation regarding the frequent
invocation of activist rhetoric by the Supreme Court in its early
21
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Charter judgments. My claim is that, beneath this bravado, the
Charterhas thrown the Court into a crisis over the legitimacy of the
judicial role and the relationship between law and politics. While
maintaining that the Charter must receive a "large and liberal"
interpretation, the Court has insisted that its function under the
Charter is a peculiarly legal and not a political one. But the story
has not convinced anyone. Instead of arguments aimed at differentiating its function from that of the legislature, the Court has offered
only bare and hollow assertion.
B. The Operation Dismantle Case
The most obvious illustration of the Court's continuing but frustrated attempt to maintain the law/politics distinction is the opinion
of Chief Justice Dickson in the Operation Dismantle case. Faced
with the challenge by Operation Dismantle to the testing of the
cruise missile in Canada, it was all well and good for the Court to
maintain that its responsibility was to determine a legal question and
not to pass judgment on the wisdom of cruise missile testing? 3 But
here was the rub. The essence of the legal challenge was that the
decision to test the cruise would lead to an increase in the arms race
and thereby increase the chances of nuclear war. In other words, the
plaintiffs were questioning the wisdom of the government's decision
to test the cruise. They were asking a court to hear evidence on the
probable effects of the testing program and overturn the judgment
of the government of Canada on the question. The so-called legal
and political questions were simply different versions of the same
question: was it in the Canadian interest to allow the testing of the
cruise missile in Canadian airspace?
The majority judgment of Chief Justice Dickson refused to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claim on the broad basis that their challenge was
political rather than legal. To have relied on such a broad proposition would have undermined the Court's bold rhetoric about the
fundamental character of the constitutional document and its status
as a "living tree". Indeed, the Chief Justice was particularly careful
to reassure his readers on that score: "I have no doubt that disputes
of a political or foreign policy nature may be properly cognizable by
the courts."'24 Instead, the Chief Justice invoked an argument that
has a familiar legal ring to it in order to dismiss this plaintiff's state23 See the judgment of Wilson J. in Operation Dismantle, supra, note 16.
24
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ment of claim. The claim must be struck out, according to Dickson
C.J., on the narrow factual ground of causation. The causal link
between the actions of the government and the violation of the plaintiffs' rights was "simply too uncertain, speculative and hypothetical
to sustain a cause of action."2 It would be impossible to offer sufficient legal proof, as a factual matter, of the connection between the
government's decision and the increased threat of nuclear war.
Given the highly controversial nature of the contemporary claims
and counterclaims regarding the nuclear arms race, there is some
initial plausibility to this disposition of the case. But upon dissection
it becomes aparent that "causation" is a rather improbable basis for
striking out Operation Dismantle's statement of claim. The central
thrust of Chief Justice Dickson's argument is that the plaintiffs' claim
is premised on assumptions and hypotheses about how independent
and sovereign nations will react to the testing of the cruise missile.
According to the Chief Justice, such reactions are purely a matter of
speculation and cannot be proven one way or the other. For instance,
one of the plaintiffs' allegations was that the testing of the cruise
missile would result in an increased military presence in Canada,
which would make Canada a more likely target of nuclear attack.
But, as Chief Justice Dickson points out, this argument assumes
certain reactions of hostile foreign powers to an increased military
presence and also makes an assumption about the degree to which
Canada is already a possible target of nuclear attack. "Given the
impossibility of determining how an independent sovereign nation
might react, it can only be a matter of hypothesis whether an increased American presence would make Canada more vulnerable to
nuclear attack. It would not be possible to prove it one way or the
other."20
Underlying the argument is an assumption about the nature of
the distinction between facts and values, and the relationship between this distinction and legal arguments. The distinction between
facts and values is portrayed in terms that are fixed and absolute.
Facts exist, independent of human intervention or desire. They can
be ascertained and proven through an objectively correct and neutral
methodology. Conversely, anything which is not a fact is a mere
opinion or conjecture. The world can be categorized and comprehended on the basis of a dichotomy between reason and desire:
either something is objectively true and discernible by reason or else
25
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it is hopelessly subjective and governed by speculation and appetite.
It is pointless to seek to demonstrate the truth or falsity of subjective
opinions. Thus, the opponents of the cruise missile testing are
"entitled to their opinion and belief" but such opinions lie "in the
realm of conjecture rather than fact"
This fact/value dichotomy serves as the toehold securing the
legitimacy of judicial review under the Charter.On this view, judicial review under the Charter can be distinguished from political
argument through an appeal to the objective quality of the proof
demanded in legal argument. Judicial review is concerned with
objective facts rather than subjective opinions. Courts adjudicate
claims which are capable of proof in an objective manner, whereas
the political branches of government make mere subjective value
choices.
An obvious, if disquieting, example of this is the government's
decision to permit the testing of the cruise missile. Since it is impossible to prove whether the cruise program will lead to an increased
risk of nuclear war, it is appropriate that such a decision be taken
by the political and not the legal authorities. In effect, the dichotomy
between facts and values itself fortifies the barrier between law and
politics. Law is both constituted and legitimated by the objectivity
of the factual. Politics is passion and subjectivity, the irrational working out of conflicting desire and opinion.
These premises seem wrong on both counts; the distinction between facts and values is not absolute, while legal proof and argument extend beyond the realm of the factual. As to the first issue, it
is a gross oversimplification to suppose that human knowledge
comes in only two packages, the one labelled objective, the other subjective. To put this another way, the mere fact that an issue cannot
be resolved in some neutral or mechanical fashion does not mean
that it must be relegated to the category of mere whim or caprice.
It is possible to acknowledge the contingent and value-laden character of an enterprise and yet make rational and meaningful arguments about that enterprise. In fact, an important tradition in contemporary philosophy is premised on the belief that all branches of
knowledge, including the so-called neutral disciplines of the natural
sciences, are shot through with subjective and contingent elements. 8
This contingency does not entail the conclusion that there is nothing
27
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meaningful to be said about these subjects, or that one opinion is
necessarily as persuasive as any other.
Just as it is misleading to posit an absolute dichotomy between
facts and values, so too it is false to claim that legal proof is concerned exclusively with facts. In a sense, this is the point made by
Madam Justice Wilson in her rebuttal to the argument of the Chief
Justice on the causation issue. Madam Justice Wilson claims that
legal argument may properly be heard on issues of intangible fact.
Intangible facts are "inferences from real facts" and may also be the
subject of opinion. Wilson J. illustrates her argument through reference to the case of McGhee v. National Coal Board.' The issue in
this case, whether the lack of shower facilities caused the plaintiff's
skin disease, was a matter of medical opinion, but it was also "in
law a determination which the courts can properly infer from the
surrounding facts and expert opinion evidence.""0 According to
Madam Justice Wilson, the claim of the plaintiffs, Operation Dismantle, is also premised on such intangible facts. Although she entertained doubts whether the plaintiffs could prove their case at trial,
she argued that it was not the function of the court on a preliminary
motion to prejudge the issue.
Of course there is a possible point of distinction between the
McGhee case and Operation Dismantle. Although McGhee involved the court drawing inferences based on mere medical opinion,
these inferences related to events which had already taken place.
The plaintiffs had already suffered harm and the only question was
whether this harm had been legally caused by the defendants. In
Operation Dismantle, the court is faced with a situation where the
harm has not yet occurred and is-by no means certain to occur. In
fact, in order to sustain the plaintiffs' claim, the court would have
had to have made a prediction about the reactions of independent
and sovereign nations to the foreign policy decisions of the Canadian
government.
It is not clear why this point of distinction between the cases
should be taken to be conclusive. The issue at this stage of the litigation was simply whether the plaintiffs' claim should be permitted
to proceed to trial. Accordingly, the question to be decided is whether
courts should be barred from hearing evidence and drawing inferences regarding the reactions of independent and sovereign nations.
- McGhee v. National Coal Board [1972 3 All E.R. ioo8 (H.L.) [hereinafter
McGhee].
30 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 16 at 478 per Wilson J.
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Moreover, it should not be sufficient to establish that, in this particular case, the plaintiffs are going to have an extremely difficult time
proving their factual allegations. This is simply a corollary of the
general rule that, on a motion to strike, the facts pleaded in the
statement of claim must be deemed to have been proven."
It need hardly be emphasized that there is no general bar to
courts hearing evidence and making assumptions about the future
reactions of independent and sovereign actors, whether they be individuals or groups. Consider our most basic assumptions about the
behaviour of markets. Whenever we predict how a market will
respond to fluctuations in price, supply or other variables, we are
making a prediction about the reactions of sovereign and independent actors - in this case, the consumers in a market. Bearing this
in mind, recall the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Reference Re Anti-Inflation Act? 2 In this case, the Supreme Court
admitted and relied upon a large body of extrinsic evidence in order
to determine the constitutional validity of the federal government's
anti-inflation program. 3 This material dealt with the state of the
Canadian economy in 1975 and the likely success of the anti-

inflation program in bringing inflation under control. In short, the
evidence tried to establish how millions of individuals, corporations
and other economic actors would react to the government's restraint
program. The Court examined the material, at least for the limited
purpose of determining whether there was a rational basis for the
government's decision to enact the legislation. 4
It is difficult to understand how an a priori distinction can be
drawn between the extrinsic material considered in the Anti-Inflation Reference and the evidence which Operation Dismantle wished
to place before the Court. For example, one of the claims of Operation Dismantle was that the testing would lead to an increased
American military presence in Canada, which would make Canada
a more likely target of nuclear attack. The objection of the Chief
Ibid. at 475, referring to Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of
Canada [198o] 2 S.C.R. 735 at 740, 115 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 1, 33 N.R. 304 per
Estey J.
32 [1976] 2 S.C.R. 373, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452 [hereinafter Anti-Inflation Reference].
33 Ibid. These extrinsic materials included a study by economist Richard Lipsey
dealing with the state of the Canadian economy in 1975 and the various
policy options in dealing with inflation; a transcript of a speech by the
Governor of the Bank of Canada, Mr. Gerald Bouey, rebutting the Lipsey
study; and a 'comment' by the Ontario Office of Economic Policy on the
1975 economic environment designed to show the need for national action.
34 Ibid. at 391 per Laskin C.J.C.
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Justice was that this argument made assumptions about the degree
to which Canada is already a possible target of nuclear attack, and
assumed certain reactions of hostile foreign powers to an increased
military presence. According to Chief Justice Dickson, these difficulties meant that it "would not be possible to prove ... one way or

the other" whether an increased American presence would make
Canada more vulnerable to nuclear attack."
The obvious response to the argument is that these difficulties
might be overcome through the hearing of evidence and expert
testimony. The Court could have heard evidence on the extent to
which Canada is already a target of nuclear attack as well as the
probable effect of an increased American presence. As in the AntiInflation Reference, the evidence might be admitted merely to establish whether there was a rational basis for the government's decision
in this particular case. Thus, the causation argument provides an
inadequate justification for the Court's holding in the case. This is
not to suggest that the Court's holding could not be justified; the
point is simply that the justification would have to be framed in
terms of some larger considerations of public policy rather than the
narrow grounds of causation.
The majority opinion in the Operation Dismantle case illustrates
the conflicting tendencies at work in the Court's early Chartercases.
On the one hand, the Court is clearly motivated by a desire to escape
the infamy associated with its Bill of Rights jurisprudence and to
give a "large and liberal" interpretation to the various Charter
guarantees. But the overwhelming concern of the Court is to ensure
that this civil libertarian stance does not result in the collapse of the
distinction between law and politics.
The opinion of the Chief Justice in Operation Dismantle highlights the tension between these conflicting tendencies and the failure
of the Court in reconciling them. The Operation Dismantle litigation was particularly exemplary since it placed the political character
of Charterlitigation in stark relief. The litigation was political not
simply in the sense that the testing of the cruise missile was a highly
controversial issue in the political arena. More important was the
nature of the claim raised by the plaintiffs. The essence of their
claim was that the government had been wrong to allow cruise
missile testing in Canadian airspace. The plaintiffs wanted the Court
to declare that the foreign policy of the government, far from
advancing Canadian welfare, was actually increasing the risk of
35 Operation Dismantle, supra, note 16 at 453 per Dickson G.J.C.
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nuclear war. Confronted with the prospect of having to substitute
its own opinion about the wisdom of cruise missile testing for that of
the government, the Court took refuge in an unconvincing argument
about causation. It also took the opportunity to reassert and defend
the central distinction between the objectivity of legal reasoning and
the subjectivity of political argument.
C. Political Judges and Section r: The Oakes Case
If this fundamental issue of legitimacy is kept in mind, certain
distinctive tendencies and patterns begin to emerge in the other
Charter cases decided by the Supreme Court. The most striking is
the Court's treatment of s. i. I argued earlier that the s. i balancing
of interests appeared to be just another way of asking the basic
legislative question: is this worth what it costs? Given the overtly
political character of such an analysis, we would expect to observe
the Court experiencing particular difficulty in interpreting and
applying this section.
The striking feature of the early Supreme Court Chartercases was
the absence of any meaningful discussion of the principles to govern
the application of s. i.Until the 1986 judgment of the Court in
R. v. Oakes, the Court had managed to sidestep the difficult question
of how to balance interests under s. i without also questioning the
wisdom of legislative enactments.
In a number of the early cases, the avoidance of s. i analysis
appeared somewhat strained and contrived. In the Quebec Protestant School Boards case, " the Quebec government had argued that
its restrictions on access to English schooling were reasonable within
the meaning of s. i, in view of factors such as demographic patterns,
the physical and lingustic mobility of individuals and the regional
distribution of interprovincial migrants. In essence, the Government
of Quebec was asking the Court to pass judgment on the wisdom of
its policy with respect to English schooling. The Court refused to
enter into such an inquiry, on the basis of a rather curious argument.
The Court held that s. i did not have to be considered since "[t]he
provisions of s. 73 of Bill ioi collide directly with those of s. 23 of
the Charter, and are not limits which can be legitimized by s. i of
the Charter."37 The Court's argument appeared to rely on the
36 Attorney General of Quebec v. Quebec Association of ProtestantSchool Bds.
[19841 2 S.C.R. 66, io D.L.R. ( 4 th) 321.
7 Ibid. at 88.
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alleged distinction between limiting and denying a right: where
there is direct conflict between a Charter right and government
legislation, the legislation can be ruled invalid on a categorical basis,
without even considering s. I.
The argument is only convincing if the distinction between limiting and denying a right is meaningful. The difficulty with the distinction is that it does not appear to offer a determinate basis for
deciding cases. A particular state restriction on rights can be made
to appear as either a limit or a denial, depending on the level of
generality at which the right in question is defined. Suppose a
municipality passed a bylaw prohibiting all demonstrations or
marches in the city for a period of thirty days."8 There are equally
plausible arguments suggesting that this could be either a limit or a
denial of the right to freedom of association. If the thirty day period
of the bylaw is taken as the operative time frame, then the residents
of the city could be said to have suffered a complete denial of their
right to associate during that period. On the other hand, if the right
of association is defined in more general and abstract terms, it could
plausibly be argued that this general right has not been completely
denied, but only limited for the modest period of thirty days. There
is nothing in the concepts of limit or denial which instructs the jurist
as to which of these two alternative arguments is to be preferred. In
effect, the terms limit and denial are not themselves grounds for
decision, but mere conclusory labels attached post hoc to an analysis
determined on other, independent grounds.
Such techniques of confession and avoidance were abandoned in
the Court's recent judgment in Oakes, where Chief Justice Dickson
suggested a general approach for the application of s. I, as well as a
particular framework of analysis to structure its application to particular cases. The opinion of the Chief Justice enjoyed the support
of four other members of the Court and thus, for the time being at
least, represents the considered opinion of the majority of our highest
court on these issues.
The analysis of the Chief Justice appears to constitute a compelling rebuttal to claims that courts are inevitably inquiring into
the wisdom of legislation in applying s. i. The Chief Justice has
devised a framework which is designed to put constitutional and
legal flesh on the political skeleton of s. i. Armed with the objective
and manageable standards enunciated, lower courts may now
38
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robustly measure legislation against the dictates of those neutral
standards.
This attempt by the Supreme Court to come to terms with the
open-ended quality of s. I is a welcome development. However,
while the analysis purports to offer neutral and objective standards
to guide the application of s. i, this alleged objectivity is wholly
illusory. The framework of the Chief Justice necessarily requires the
judiciary to question the wisdom of legislation, albeit in a disguised
fashion. Thus, far from resolving the lingering doubts about the
legitimacy of the judicial role under the Charter, the opinion unintentionally lends credence to such claims.
David Edwin Oakes was charged with unlawful possession of a
narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, contrary to s. 4(2) of the
Narcotic Control Act. " At his trial, the Crown established that Mr.
Oakes had been in possession of eight one-gram vials of cannabis
resin in the form of hashish oil. The Crown then sought to rely on
the reverse onus provision in s. 8 of the Act, in order to establish the
offence of trafficking. 0 The trial judge found that there was no
rational or necessary connection between the fact proved - possession of the drug -

and the inference asked to be drawn -

posses-

sion for the purpose of trafficking. He found that s. 8 of the Act
violated the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, guaranteed by s. I (d) of the Charter.Section 8 was accordingly rendered
39 R.S.C. 1970, c. N-s. The analysis which follows is drawn from P. Monahan
and A. Petter, "Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1985-86 Term"
(1987) 9 Supreme Court L.R. (forthcoming).
40 S. 8 provides that:
In any prosecution for a violation of subsection 4(2), if the accused does
not plead guilty, the trial shall proceed as if it were a prosecution for an
offence under section 3, and after the close of the case for the prosecution
and after the accused has had an opportunity to make full answer and
defence, the court shall make a finding as to whether or not the accused
was in possession of the narcotic contrary to section 3; if the court finds
that the accused was not in possession of the narcotic contrary to section
3, he shall be acquitted but if the court finds that the accused was in
possession of the narcotic contrary to section 3, he shall be given an opportunity of establishing that he was not in possession of the narcotic for
the purpose of trafficking, and thereafter the prosecutor shall be given an
opportunity of adducing evidence to establish that the accused was in
possession of the narcotic for the purpose of trafficking; if the accused
establishes that he was not in possession of the narcotic for the purpose of
trafficking he shall be acquitted of the offence as charged but he shall be
convicted of an offence under section 3 and sentenced accordingly; and
if the accused fails to establish that he was not in possession of the narcotic
for the purpose of trafficking, he shall be convicted of the offence as
charged and sentenced accordingly.
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inoperative and, in the absence of any further Crown evidence tending to establish an intention to traffic, the accused was acquitted.41
This disposition of the case was unanimously upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. Mr. Justice Martin, speaking for the Court,
concluded that s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act was unconstitutional
"because of the lack of a rational connection between the proved
fact (possession) and the presumed fact (an intention to traffic).","
The further appeal by the Crown to the Supreme Court of Canada
was dismissed unanimously, although two separate opinions were
issued. Chief Justice Dickson, writing for himself and four others,
began by finding that s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act imposed a
legal burden on an accused to prove on a balance of probabilities
that he or she was not in possession of a narcotic for the purpose of
trafficking. The Chief Justice concluded that he "had no doubt
whatsoever" that s. 8 violated the presumption of innocence in s.
II(d) of the Charter. This conclusion followed from the fact that
the accused was required to establish his innocence on a balance of
probabilities; accordingly, it would be possible to convict an accused
who had succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt as to his innocence
but had failed to satisfy the balance of probabilities standard. Turning to s. I, the Chief Justice observed that any s. x inquiry "must be
premised on an understanding that the impugned limit violates
constitutional rights and freedoms - rights and freedoms which are
part of the supreme law of Canada".4 3 Further, Dickson C.J.C. held
that it is clear "from the text of s. i" that limits on rights are "exceptions to their general guarantee". The purpose of s. i is to allow
limits on rights when "their exercise would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of fundamental importance". Accordingly,
although the standard of proof under s. I is the civil standard of
proof by a preponderance of probability, this standard must be
applied "rigorously" and "a very high degree of probability will be
.'commensurate with the occasion."
The Chief Justice set out two central criteria which must be satisfied by the state before a legal limit on rights can be justified. First,
the objective or goal of the law must "at a minimum, ... relate to
concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic
41 See R. v. Oakes (1982) 38 O.R. (2d) 598 (Ont. Prov. Ct.).

42 R. v. Oakes (983)
145 D.L.R. (3d) 123 at 147; 2 C.0.C. (3d) 339 (Ont.
C.A.).
-3 R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at 135; 50 0.R. (3d) i.
44 Ibid. at 138.
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society . . .'% Second, the means chosen must be proportionate to
the goal. There are three components of a test of proportionality.
The means must be rationally connected to the objective; the means
must impair individual rights as little as possible; and there must be
a proportionality between the effects of the means and the objective
which has been identified as of sufficient importance."
Applying this framework to s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act, the
Chief Justice was of the view that Parliament's concern with decreasing drug trafficking could be characterized as "substantial and pressing". Thus the reverse onus provision satisfied the first branch of
the s. i inquiry. But the provision failed the proportionality test, on
the grounds that there was no rational connection between the basic
fact of possession and the presumed fact of possession for the purpose
of trafficking. This meant that the presumption required under s. 8
was "overinclusive" and could produce results "in certain cases
which would defy both rationality and fairness". The provision
could not be justified under s. I and was of no force and effect.
The opinion of the Chief Justice suggests that the s. I analysis is
determinate and objective. The court need not be concerned with
the wisdom of legislative policy, but only with the separate question
of whether it satisfies the two-pronged test under s. i. There are a
number of features of the analysis which contribute to this sense of
objectivity and neutrality. First, the inquiry is framed in terms of
the traditional and familiar standard of proof in civil cases, proof
on a preponderance of probability. This characterization evokes the
imagery of a court deciding a garden-variety dispute between private
parties. The court will hear evidence on the s. I issue and then determine, as it would in any private litigation, whether the civil standard
of proof has been satisfied. Of course, the evidence and arguments
in a Charter case will often be complex and require the court to
exercise considerable discretion. But this is not significantly different
from the task of a court in complex civil litigation. Since the court's
competence in these complex civil cases is generally accepted, there
should be no serious qualms about the judiciary embarking on the
task of Charteradjudication.
There is a second feature of the judgment which is even more
crucial in terms of bolstering the legitimacy of the Court's role. This
is the manner in which the Chief Justice actually applies the s. I
analysis. The Chief Justice accepts the validity of the state's goal in
45
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enacting s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act. He strikes down the provision on the basis that Parliament has pursued its policy in an
irrational way. The constitutional objection is not to the state's policy
as such but to the manner in which it has attempted to carry out
that policy. The Court's ruling appears wholly instrumentalist, designed to measure the fit between the state goal and the means
chosen to achieve that goal. Assuming a decidedly deferential posture, the Court is saying to Parliament: given that you have decided
to pursue this goal, you have done so in a way that is arbitrary or
irrational.
This type of analysis appears to resolve any possible tension
between judicial review and democratic values. Under a rationality
standard, judges are not purporting to substitute their values for
those of legislators. The Court is simply ensuring that legislation
accurately reflects the chosen values of the legislators themselves.
This could be regarded as the perfection of democracy rather than
its negation. Judicial review is promoting precision and care in the

drafting of legislation and eliminating needless and arbitrary restrictions of individual liberty. There is nothing undemocratic about

requiring the legislature to pursue its goals in a precise and careful
fashion.
A similar set of assumptions underlies the "least restrictive means"

analysis, the second branch of the proportionality test outlined by
the Chief Justice. As with the rationality standard, the least restrictive means test does not purport to dictate to the state which value
choices it must pursue or avoid. Rather, it is a limited attempt to
identify inefficient legislation. The least restrictive means analysis
says to the legislature: given that you have decided to pursue this
goal, you have done so inefficiently. There are other legislative devices available which would allow you to pursue the same goal, but
in a manner which would be less restrictive of individual liberty. It
seems self-evident that the state should never restrict individual
liberty needlessly. Given a choice, the state must select the device
that is least intrusive in terms of the fundamental values guaranteed
by the Charter.
It is hardly a coincidence that the trial court and both appellate
courts in Oakes resolved the constitutional issue on the basis of the
rationality standard. Indeed, it is rather safe to predict that whenever courts in the future decide to invalidate legislation, they will
focus on the irrationality of the law or stress the availability of less
restrictive means. This is because these techniques allow the court
to overturn legislation without appearing to be a "super-legislature".
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The crucial question is whether these techniques actually enable the
court to avoid having to assess the wisdom of legislative policy, or
whether they simply invite the court to make such a political judgment in a more covert fashion.
In my view, courts under the Charter can never escape the task
of evaluating the policies chosen by the legislature. The rationality
standard, although apparently neutral, requires just such a political
evaluation on the part of judges.
The political character of the rationality standard becomes
apparent from a consideration of those instances in which it has
been applied in the American context. Consider the following example, developed by Professor Ely from the facts of Smith v.
Cahoon.4 7 Professor Ely asks his readers to suppose that a new and
unusually effective truck brake was developed 8 The legislature
would undoubtedly be given a wide degree of latitude in deciding
whether to require installation of the new brake. Given the cost of
the new brake, it might be open to the legislature to require some,
but not all, truck owners to install it. For example, a law which
required installation of the brake on all trucks whose weight exceeded
five tons might well be valid. The burden on the legislature would
be to demonstrate that the distinction drawn by the law was rationally relatable to the goal of promoting traffic safety. It could discharge this burden in a variety of ways; for instance, if it could be
shown that the heavier a truck is, the harder it is to stop, then
requiring the brakes on heavy trucks promotes safety to a greater
extent than requiring them on light trucks.
But not all distinctions could be shown to be rationally relatable
to the goal of traffic safety. Professor Ely offers the example of a law
which requires the brake to be installed on all trucks except those
carrying seafood 9 According to Ely, this is an irrational law. From
the point of view of safety, the distinction between trucks carrying
seafood and those carrying other goods is irrelevant; trucks carrying
seafood are just as likely to benefit from the installation of the new
brake as are any others. Similarly, there is no indication that the
installation of the brake on trucks carrying seafood is exceptionally
47 (1981)

283 U.S. 553. In this case, the Court struck down an exemption for
carriers of farm products and certain seafoods from a Florida law requiring
commercial carriers to post security against liability for injuries caused by
their negligence.
48 J. Ely, "Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law"
(1970)

79 Yale L.J. 12o5 at 1237-39.

49 This was the distinction employed in Smith v. Cahoon, supra, note 47.
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expensive or difficult. Thus the distinction is not rationally relatable
to the goals of either traffic safety or driver economy.
Yet the characterization of the law as irrational is surely misplaced. It is true that a distinction based on whether a truck happens
to be carrying seafood does not further the goals of traffic safety or
driver economy. But there is nothing mysterious about the inclusion
of such a distinction in a statute. The purpose of the distinction is
obviously to give a preference to the owners of trucks in the seafood
business. The exemption will save these truckers the costs of installing
the new brake and, presumably, grant them an advantage over their
competitors. It is apparent that the law had two purposes, rather
than one. The first purpose was to increase traffic safety by requiring
most trucks to install new brakes. The second purpose was to ensure
that these gains in traffic safety did not come at the expense of
increasing the costs of truckers transporting seafood.
Perhaps it might be argued that there is something inherently
irrational about conferring special benefits or exemptions on one
industry as opposed to another. But this argument would be mistaken. It is an uncontroversial feature of our tax laws, for example,
that certain industries or individuals may be granted more favourable tax treatment than others. The state might decide to grant
special tax exemptions to the oil industry, but not to artists. Thus, in
the context of our trucking example, there is very little doubt that
the legislature could have granted a special tax concession to truckers
transporting seafood but have denied the concession to others. It
would be absurd to claim that such a law was irrational, in the sense
that it failed to further its goal. A tax exemption for trucks carrying
seafood fits perfectly its goal, which is to confer a competitive advantage on such truckers.
Thus the hypothetical law exempting trucks carrying seafood
from installing new brakes is not irrational. The law advances the
goal of promoting safety, but not at the expense of truckers carrying
seafood. The claim of irrationality is really little more than a judgment that one of these purposes, the goal of preferring seafood
truckers, is unacceptable. The court simply ignores the impugned
purpose, and then concludes that the legislature does not further the
goals which remain."
50 This was essentially the technique employed in Smith v. Cahoon, supra, note

47, in which the Court considered only the goal of traffic safety and ignored
other possible purposes of the law.
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This analysis is not exceptional or aberrant. Laws are never passed
without reasons. Those reasons may be complex and involve a tradeoff between a number of competing goals, but the reasons always
exist. The issue is never whether a law is rational or not but, rather,
whether it has been passed for good reasons or for bad reasons.
Accordingly, the conclusion that a law is irrational is not achieved
by measuring the fit between a law and its real purposes; it is a
product of evaluating the fit between the law and some contrived
and restrictive set of judicial purposes."
So the rationality standard is not simply a neutral process of measuring the fit between the goals of legislation and the means chosen
to achieve those goals. Instead, it requires judges to make an evaluation of the adequacy of the goals themselves. In short, the judgment
of Chief Justice Dickson in the Oakes case, while purporting to
downplay the political character of the s. i inquiry, merely confirms
the necessity of political judgments in Charter adjudication."
So the first story that can be told about the early Chartercases in
the Supreme Court is rather simple and straightforward. It has been
particularly important to the Court to give at least the appearance
of breaking with the discredited tradition of the Bill of Rights cases.
But the Court wants to accomplish this first objective without calling
into question the basic legitimacy of the judicial role, in particular,
the distinction between legal and political reasoning. The sticking
point is that the Court has not yet hit on a method for accomplishing both of these goals simultaneously. Indeed, a careful analysis of
the early Charter opinions of the Court illustrates the inherently
political character of the Court's reasoning. I chose to make this
point by focusing on the Court's opinions in Operation Dismantle
and Oakes, but a similar critique could have been offered of any of
the other Charterjudgments of the Court. The value-laden character
of the Court's analysis illustrates the hollowness of the claim that the
legitimacy of judicial review is a nonissue in the Canadian context.
If judicial review under the Charteris to be justified, it cannot be
on the spurious basis that the adjudication process is neutral or
objective. Any convincing justification must take into account the
value-laden nature of judicial review and attempt to reconcile this
51 For the elaboration and application of this critique to a wide number of con-

52

texts, see Note, "Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection"
(1972) 82 Yale L.J. 123.
Due to space limitations, I have not considered Dickson C.J.C.'s particular
analysis of s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act. For a discussion of this part of
the Chief Justice's opinion, see P. Monahan and A. Petter, supra, note 39.
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political role for judges with traditional democratic values. The next
section considers two such justifications, both of which are prominent in contemporary American discussions of judicial review.
III. THE AMERICAN ESCAPE ROUTES CONSIDERED:
ORIGINALISM AND "FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS"
A. The First Escape: Originalism
A theory which has enjoyed substantial popularity and influence
amongst American commentators seeks to resolve textual indeterminacy through an appeal to the original intentions of the framers.
According to this theory, the courts should give meaning to the openended clauses of the constitution by interpreting them in accordance
with the views of the individuals who drafted them." By observing
this canon of construction, judges can avoid the charge that they are
usurping legislative power. Far from imposing their own values, the
courts are merely giving effect to the enduring, fundamental values
of the polity as embodied in the constitutional text. To the extent
that those fundamental values now appear outdated, the appropriate
remedy is a formal constitutional amendment rather than creative
judicial interpretation.
It is important to appreciate the distinctiveness of the originalist
argument. Originalism does not merely claim that the intentions of
the framers deserve to be considered or even to be accorded presumptive weight in the interpretive process. The identifying feature
of the originalist argument is the claim that the intentions of the
framers should be conclusive in resolving textual ambiguity. If it is
possible to ascertain how the framers would have applied a particular constitutional provision, then that interpretation must govern,
regardless of any arguments or considerations to the contrary.
A virtual cottage industry has sprung up in the past decade aimed
at discrediting the claims of originalism.' The criticisms fall into
two camps. The first group of critics raise essentially pragmatic
R. Bork,
"Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems" (x971) Indiana
L.J.; H. Monaghan, "Our Perfect Constitution" (1981) 56 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
353.
54 It would be impossible to refer to even a small portion of this literature here.
Perhaps the most compelling case against originalism is to be found in P.
Brest, "The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding" (i98o)
6o Bos. U.L. Rev. 204; see also R. Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle", in
A Matter of Principle (1985).
'3 See, for example, R. Berger, Government by Judiciary (x977);
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objections to the originalist argument. These objections are designed
to demonstrate the inherent impossibility of ascertaining the collective intention of a group of men who have been dead for nearly two
hundred years. The critics focus on the illusory nature of group
intent, point out that the framers' intention on many questions was
indeterminate, and argue that it is impossible for any contemporary
observer to truly understand the intent of individuals who lived in
eighteenth century America. This last argument is premised on the
assumption that the world-view of the framers is so fundamentally
foreign to our own that it would be mistaken and presumptuous to
suppose that we could ever really appreciate their intent.
What force do these pragmatic objections hold in the context of
the Canadian Charter? In general, the objections seem much less
persuasive. This does not mean that it is ever going to be a straightforward or mechanical matter to determine the views of the drafters
with respect to substantive provisions of the Charter.The first and
most obvious difficulty will be who is to count as the drafters.
According to the Supreme Court's judgment in the Patriation
Reference,55 constitutional convention at the time of the enactment
of the Charterrequired that the substantial consent of the provinces
be obtained before the joint resolution could be forwarded to Great
Britain. This suggests that it would be necessary to canvass the views
of provincial as well as federal officials in determining drafters'
intention. Yet we have virtually no record of provincial views on the
meaning or application of specific substantive provisions of the
Charter.
A second problem is that very few members of the federal Senate
and House of Commons appear to have formed any independent
views as to the meaning of the various Charterprovisions. Instead,
they simply relied on officials in the Department of Justice to provide
them with expert opinion about the meaning of Charterphraseology.
The deference of elected representatives towards departmental officials was made crystal clear in the committee hearings on the proposed resolution.56 Thus the relevant intention appears to be that of
officials in the federal Department of Justice, rather than that of
elected representatives in either the provinces or Parliament.
55 Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution [I98I] I S.C.R. 753, 125 D.L.R.
(3d) x.
56 See Special Joint Committee on the Constitution of Canada, Proceedings,
32nd Parl., Sess. i (x98o-8i), No. 46 [hereinafter Proceedings].
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The irony is that, in purely pragmatic terms, the domination of
the process by unelected federal officials may be more a virtue than
a vice. There is no surer way to foreclose problems of indeterminacy
in constitutional provisions than through appeal to a bureaucratic
hierarchy. The dominant role played by the federal bureaucracy
makes the instrumental task of determining drafters' intent much
easier than if one had to consult the conflicting and often self-serving
opinions of a group of elected Parliamentarians. Rather than being
confronted with a cacophony of conflicting opinion, one is presented
with a single, distilled interpretation of the meaning of various
Charterprovisions. To consider but one example, there can be little
doubt as to the views of officials in the Department of Justice on the
issue of whether s. 7 of the Charter was to receive a procedural as
opposed to a substantive interpretation. In testimony before the
Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, the Department made
it clear that it regarded s. 7 of the Charter as providing purely
procedural as opposed to substantive protection for "life, liberty and
security of the person" r5 The Department hoped to avoid the line
of American cases based on "substantive due process" and chose the
words "fundamental justice" rather than "due process" in an
attempt to achieve this result. In sum, if the views of the drafters
are dispositive, there can be little doubt as to how the ambiguity in
s. 7 ought to be resolved.
While the existence of this expert opinion may be helpful in overcoming purely pragmatic difficulties in determining drafters' intention, it resolves none of the principled, normative objections to
originalism. The mere fact that we might be capable of ascertaining
the intent of the drafters does not mean that their intention should
necessarily govern. Constitutional theories based on original intent
must be normative as well as descriptive; the theory must provide a
reason why the views of the drafters ought to count in the interpretive process.5 "
See the comments of Mr. B. L. Strayer, then Assistant Deputy Minister,
Public Law, Department of Justice, speaking before the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on 27 January s98s:
Mr. Chairman, it was our belief that the words 'fundamental justice'
would cover the same thing as what is called procedural due process, that
is the meaning of due process in relation to requiring fair procedure. However, it in our view does not cover the concept of what is. called substantive
due process, which would impose substantive requirements as to policy of
the law in question.
Proceedings,supra, note 57 at 32.
58 Dworkin, supra, note 54.
57
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In a sense, it is rather easy to defend the claim that some minimal
weight ought to attach to the views of the drafters of a constitution.
The argument flows from the basic observation that the process of
interpretation is necessarily contextual. Words do not speak for
themselves. Language has meaning only within a particular context.
To attempt to interpret language apart from the context in which it
is used is a recipe for unresolvable indeterminacy. A central feature
of linguistic context is the purposes and understandings of the individuals using the language. Thus, on this view, it is self-evident that
some attention must be paid to the intentions of the drafters of the
Charterif we are to make any sense at all of the document.
But this argument does not inform us of the extent to which the
drafters' views ought to figure in the interpretive process. The first
issue is whether their views should be accorded conclusive weight in
the interpretive process. The best way to resolve this issue is to
analyse what might be termed the interpretive intent of the drafters
of the Charter.American writers on judicial review have made an
important distinction between two very different senses in which we
might use the term "drafters' intent". 59 The drafters' substantive
intent refers to their views as to the actual meaning of the various
constitutional provisions they have enacted. The drafters' interpretive intent refers to their understanding of how those substantive
provisions are to be interpreted and applied by the courts. The
distinction is important because there is no necessary connection
between substantive and interpretive intent. The drafters may hold
very fixed substantive views as to the meaning of certain constitutional provisions, but may also regard their personal beliefs as irrelevant in terms of the legal interpretation of the provisions; their views
on interpretation might be based, for example, on a plain meaning
rule, which would make judicial recourse to legislative history inappropriate."0
Defenders of originalism suppose that only the drafters' substantive intent is relevant. But this is obviously mistaken. If one were
really serious about fidelity to the intention of the drafters, one would
have to at least begin with their views as to the nature of the interpretive process. It would be ironic and bizarre to rely on the drafters'
substantive views without first determining whether they themselves
regarded those substantive views as conclusive.
59 This distinction has been
in particular, the helpful
60 See ibid. ,t 215-16. See
Original Intent" (1985)

highlighted by American critics of originalism. See,
article by Brest, supra, note 54 at 205-16.
also H. Powell, "The Original Understanding of
98 Harv. L.R. 885.
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These distinctions are particularly relevant in the Canadian context, since we have a full legislative record outlining the interpretive
views of the Canadian drafters. This legislative record makes it clear
that the Canadian drafters did not envisage their substantive views
on the meaning of various Charterprovisions as being conclusive of
constitutional meaning. Rather, their view of constitutional interpretation might be described as one of modified judicial realism. This
modified realism was a product of our drafters' analysis of the nature
and development of constitutional interpretation in the United
States. Notwithstanding the recent protests of legal academics, the
American constitutional tradition has never been premised on the
belief that the original intention of the drafters should be conclusive
on issues of textual indeterminacy. The American courts may have
considered the intentions of the framers on occasion, but they have
certainly not hesitated to ignore those views when they found other
values or interpretations more compelling. As Paul Brest has pointed
out, a substantial portion of contemporary American constitutional
doctrine has evolved in this way:
[I] f you consider the evolution of doctrines in just about any extensively adjudicated area of constitutional law - whether 'under' the
commerce, free speech, due process, or equal protection clauses explicit reliance on originalist sources has played a very small role
compared to the elaboration of the Court's own precedents. It is
rather like having a remote ancestor who came over on the Mayflower. 1
The drafters of the Charterexpected that the Canadian constitutional tradition would develop in a broadly similar fashion. Canada's
judges were not expected to consult the substantive opinions of the
drafters each time they were faced with ambiguous Charter language. It was thought that the courts would rely on a variety of
nonoriginalist sources, including judge-made rules of statutory construction and previous judicial decisions on similar language. Reliance on these sources meant that judicial interpretations of Charter
provisions might well diverge from the drafters' substantive intentions regarding those provisions. But the drafters regarded this judicial originality as an inherent feature of constitutional interpretation
under the Charter.They had a relatively sophisticated and realistic
view of the nature of the adjudication process. For them, constitutional adjudication was far from mechanical or formalistic. They
were aware of the significant degree of discretion available to courts
01

Brest, supra, note 54 at 234.
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interpreting constitutional texts. Because some degree of judicial
originality was inevitable, the drafters saw their task as making
educated guesses as to how the courts might interpret particular
constitutional language, and choosing the language which was most
likely to secure them the results they desired.
The best way to illustrate this modified judicial realism is to consider the discussion surrounding a particular substantive Charter
provision. The debate over the nature of s. 7 is particularly Muminating. In drafting s. 7 of the Charter, the Department had hoped to
provide procedural but not substantive protection for "life, liberty
and security of the person". Yet there was considerable confusion
during the Parliamentary hearings as to why the Department had
inserted the words "principles of fundamental justice" rather than
"procedural due process" in s. 7; to the lay members of the Parliamentary Committee, the words "due process" seemed to capture
the Department's intent much more accurately than the novel and
baffling "principles of fundamental justice". 2 The response of the
Department is instructive. Justice officials did not claim that the
phrase "principles of fundamental justice" was a clearer or more
accurate way to capture their intent. Indeed, when pressed on the
matter, they had to admit that the words "principles of fundamental
justice" were almost totally novel in Canadian jurisprudence. 3
Rather, they noted that the American courts had interpreted the
phrase "due process" as guaranteeing substantive protection for
property or privacy and they wanted to avoid the courts reading this
interpretation into s. 7 of the Charter. Barry Strayer, then the
Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice, explained the matter in these
terms:
[t] hese words [principles of fundamental justice] have not appeared
in a constitution or in any type of statute before, but I am bound to
add, Mr. Chairman, that there is a good deal of jurisprudence on
the term "due process", both in Canada and the United States, and
some of that jurisprudence in the United States gave rise to the
62 See, in particular, the exchange between the Hon. David Crombie and Mr.
Barry Strayer, Assistant Deputy Minister of Justice, on this issue: Proceedings, supra, note 56 at 38-43.
63 The only instance in which the words had been used previously was in s.
2(e) of the CanadianBill of Rights, in connection with the right to a fair
hearing. This had been interpreted in Duke v. The Queen [1972] S.C.R.
917 at 923 28 D.L.R. ( 3 d) 129 per Fauteux C.J.C., as follows:
Without attempting to formulate any final definition of those words, I
would take them to mean, generally, that the tribunal which adjudicates
upon his rights must act fairly, in good faith, without bias and in a judicial
temper, and must give him an opportunity to state his case.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

problem that we were trying to avoid with the term 'fundamental
justice. 64
But the matter did not rest there. When the resolution reached
the House of Commons, there was a good deal of concern expressed
over the possibility that s. 7 would limit Parliament's ability to legislate with respect to abortion. Since "conflicting legal difficulties

throw that matter into doubt",es the Hon. David Crombie proposed
that the Charterbe amended to include the words "nothing in this
charter affects the authority of Parliament to legislate in respect of
abortion." '0 In speaking against the proposed amendment, the

Prime Minister noted that the government's view was that the
Charterwas neutral on the issue of abortion. He continued:
However, as I said yesterday to the member for Etobicoke-Lakeshore,
should a judge conclude that on the contrary, the Charter does, to a
certain extent, affect certain provisions of the Criminal Code, under
the override clause we reserve the right to say: Notwithstanding this
decision, notwithstanding the charter of rights as interpreted by this
judge, the House legislates in such and such a manner on the abortion issue.Y1
It is important to retrace the steps in the government's argument
closely. The government believed that the Charter was neutral on
the abortion issue. But there were no guarantees that the courts
would necessarily see it that way. After all, the American courts had
taken the words "due process" and read into them a whole series of
substantive protections for rights of property and privacy. Moreover, the American courts had done so without relying on the intentions of the framers; the substantive due process jurisprudence was
a product of the court's own views as to the meaning of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. This is simply a reiteration of Brest's basic
point that "the practice of supplementing and derogating from the
text and original understanding is itself part of our constitutional
tradition.""8
The drafters of the Canadian Charterrecognized this reality and
sought to take account of it in their choice of constitutional language.
04 Proceedings,supra, note 56 at 33.

65 Speech of the Hon. David Crombie, House of Commons Debates, 27 November x98!.
60Ibid.
07 Speech of the Right Hon. Pierre E. Trudeau, Prime Minister, House of Commons Debates, 27 November Ig8i.
08 Brest, supra, note 54 at 225.
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Thus, while the words "procedural due process" might have been
an accurate reflection of their intentions with respect to s. 7, they
rejected them on account of the American substantive due process
jurisprudence. There was no magic in the words "fundamental
justice", even though there was an earlier court decision under the
Canadian Bill of Rights which had suggested that they provided
procedural protection only.69 Thus, if the courts interpreted the
words "fundamental justice" as importing substantive protection
for rights, Parliament could always resort to the override provision
in s. 33 of the Charter.In fact, the inclusion of the override provision is itself a recognition of the possibility of creative judicial
interpretation under the Charter. Because the Charterwould come
to be interpreted and applied in ways that were unforeseen by its
drafters, it was prudent to provide a mechanism which would enable
Parliament to limit its scope.
This conception of constitutional adjudication is a continuation
rather than a contrast with our previous constitutional tradition.
Prior to 1982, constitutional interpretation had been concerned
primarily with the terms of the ConstitutionAct, z867.70 This document has been construed with little or no reference to the actual
intentions of the Fathers of Confederation. Nor do the bare words
of the statute constitute an accurate guide to its meaning; the classes
of subjects in ss. 91 and 92 are so abstract that a whole range of
alternative interpretations of their meaning is possible. Instead,
constitutional law is composed almost exclusively of previous court
decisions which have determined the content of various constitutional provisions. These judicial elaborations are the flesh on the
constitutional skeleton.
For many years, academic lawyers complained that these judicial
interpretations of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 did not conform to the
expectations of the drafters of the document. The drafters had contemplated a highly centralized federalism for Canada. In place of
this quasi-unitary state, the Privy Council had substituted its own
idiosyncratic and romantic brand of classical, decentralized federalism.U But in recent decades, it has come to be recognized that the
19 See Duke v. The Queen, supra, note 63, interpreting the phrase "a fair
hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice" in s. 2 (e)
of the Bill of Rights.
70 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (formerly British North America Act, 1867)
[hereinafter ConstitutionAct, 1867].
71

See, for example, V. MacDonald, "Judicial Interpretations of the Canadian
Constitution" (935-36) 1 U. of T. L.J. i.
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supposed mutilation of the Constitution Act, 1867 by the Privy
Council actually was more in keeping with the underlying Canadian
political reality."2 According to the contemporary view, the country
has always been too large and diverse to tolerate the degree of centralism envisaged by the Fathers of Confederation. The provincialist
bias of the Privy Council is to be commended rather than condemned; it helped to ensure the continued relevance and vibrancy
of federal institutions in Canada. The underlying assumption is that
constitutional adjudication should be less concerned with ascertaining the views of the drafters than with ensuring that the constitution
is applied in conformity with the changing values and needs of the
polity.
The recognition of constitutional adjudication as being in keeping
with the Canadian political reality suggests that the drafters' intentions should not be conclusive in constitutional interpretation. However, this does not necessarily imply that their intentions should
be simply ignored. Indeed, it would seem impossible or absurd to
attempt to construe the Charterwithout taking the intentions of the
drafters into account in some fashion. The Court has declared its
support for a "purposive" interpretation of the Charter,which surely
makes the purposes of the drafters of the document relevant and
significant.73 Moreover, the Court's recent jurisprudence surrounding
the Constitution Act, x867 has made increasing reference to legislative history.74 Thus the real issue is not whether the drafters' intentions are relevant but rather what weight ought to be attached to
this material.
Professor Dworkin has attempted to answer this question through
reference to a distinction between "concepts" and "conceptions".
A "conception" is a specific account or understanding; a "concept"
is used to convey some general idea. Dworkin's view is that oniy the
concepts used by the drafters of the Constitution are binding on
latter interpreters. Although the drafters may well have had conceptions of their own as to the meaning of constitutional language,
these conceptions need not be used in deciding cases. According to
72

See A. Cairns, "The Judicial Committee and Its Critics" (197)

4 C.J.P.S.

301.
73 Hunter v. Southam, supra, note 13; R. v. Oakes, supra, note 43.
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For a helpful discussion of this jurisprudence, see P. Hogg, "Legislative History in Constitutional Cases", in B. Sharpe, ed., Charter Litigation Symposium (forthcoming).
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Dworkin, the drafters themselves did not intend to give their own
conceptions any special weight."'
Dworkin's distinction between concepts and conceptions, while
extremely attractive, has been subjected to widespread criticism in
the American constitutional literature.7 Despite the difficulties with
Dworkin's approach, it captures one important truth about the significance of authorial intent in constitutional interpretation: judges
deciding cases ought to take serious account of generalized purposes
or intentions of the drafters, while at the same time according less
weight to the drafters' views as to the precise meaning of particular
words or phrases. This conclusion is consistent with the process of
drafting a constitution. A constitution is designed to state the general
and enduring principles which are to govern the life of the polity.
The role of the drafters is simply to define those general purposes
rather than to decide individual cases. The task of applying the
language of the document to particular circumstances is the responsibility of judges rather than the authors. It follows that judges should
pay particular attention to the general purposes and policies of the
drafters, but accord little or no weight to their opinions on the outcome of particular cases. This analysis does not depend on Dworkin's
distinction between concepts and conceptions which, in any case,

probably never occurred to the drafters. The analysis is much more
straightforward.
My suggestion is that the use of legislative history can be structured along a continuum ranging from the more abstract and generalized purposes of the drafters, which should be accorded significant weight, to their views on the application of specific provisions,
which are entitled to minimal or no weight. The argument can be
illustrated by referring once again to the Charter. As we have seen,
the drafters expressed a number of opinions as to the effect of s. 7
on particular legislative provisions. For instance, it was claimed
that s. 7 would not have any impact on the Criminal Code provisions regarding abortion and that Parliament's power to regulate
this matter would be unimpaired by the Charter. According to the
framework offered here, these opinions on the particular application

of s. 7 should be granted little or no weight by a court called upon
to determine the constitutionality of Canada's abortion laws. At the
76

Ibid. at 136.
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See, for example, M. Perry, The Constitution, the Courts and Human
Rights: An Inquiry into the Legitimacy of Constitutional Policymaking by
the judiciary (1982).
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same time, the drafters offered their views on the general purposes
underlying s. 7, emphasizing that the provision was intended to
protect procedural rather than substantive rights. These more
generalized views are entitled to more serious consideration by a
court interpreting s. 7. They relate, not to the application of the
provision to particular cases, but to the very point of including the
provision in the Constitution in the first place. A court interested in
a purposive interpretation of s. 7 would surely accord these views
very serious consideration.
This analysis of general versus specific purposes in drafting suggests that the Supreme Court's treatment of legislative history in the
Motor Vehicle Act Reference was seriously inadequate. Lamer J.
acknowledged that the senior civil servants and politicians who
appeared before the Special Joint Committee were united in their
view that s. 7 was confined to questions of procedural justice. But
Mr. Justice Lamer concluded that this evidence, although admissible, was entitled to minimal weight. He justifies his conclusion on
two grounds. First, he states that a few federal civil servants should
not be regarded as representative of the "multiplicity of individuals
who played major roles in the negotiating, drafting and adoption of
the Charter".Y Second, he argues that adopting the views of the
drafters would mean that Charter rights would become "frozen in
time ... with little or no possibility of growth, development and
adjustment to changing societal needs." 79
Neither of Lamer J.'s arguments is particularly persuasive. The
first argument fails to take account of the fact that it was not just a
few federal civil servants who advanced a procedural interpretation
of s. 7. The proceedings of the Joint Committee indicate that all the
members of the Committee were of the view that s. 7 ought not to
receive a substantive interpretation. As for the second argument, the
objection would be convincing if the Court had been considering the
drafters' views on the particular application of s.7-What was at
issue, however, was the drafters' views on the very purpose of the
provision. For the Court to have given greater weight to this evidence
would hardly have frozen the meaning of the section, since the
evidence merely went to general principles and did not deal with
specific applications of those principles. There would have been
adequate scope for the courts to have developed a progressive inter78
79
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pretation of s. 7 while remaining faithful to the fundamental purposes and policies it was designed to serve.
I conclude that the intentions of the drafters do have a significant
role to play in constitutional interpretation. Their views should
never be taken to be conclusive on issues of doctrinal ambiguity.
But the dratfers' opinions as to the general purposes underlying
particular provisions should be given serious consideration by courts.
These authorial intentions are unlikely to compel or dictate specific
results in concrete cases, given their inherent generality. Thus, use
of legislative history will not relieve the judiciary of the difficult task
of applying general constitutional language to individual cases. It is
only by consulting history in appropriate cases that the judiciary can
hope to engage in a purposive analysis of the Charterthat is realistic
and defensible.
B. FundamentalRights Theories of JudicialReview
Another attempt to reconcile the institution of judicial review with
democracy has adopted a much more sophisticated strategy. According to this second view, it is futile to suppose that constitutional
adjudication is concerned only with the plain meaning of the text
or with the views of the framers. The strategy of this view is to concede a wide scope for judicial originality. This originality is argued
to be justified because of a particular expertise claimed by judges.
The justification for judicial review is the judicial concern with
fundamental rights!' Rights should not be taken to be synonymous
with interests or preferences. Rather, rights are a certain body of
preferences which are singled out and accorded special weight. In
this sense, certain rights-theorists have described rights as "trumps";
the special weight accorded to certain preferences means that they
can overcome arguments based solely on considerations of general
welfare.

An approach to judicial review based on rights attempts to construct boundaries around democratic politics. A political debate appropriately involves the calculation of community welfare. Although
the political process is the most appropriate institution to make compromises based on straightforward utilitarian principles, questions of
rights are thought to be within the competence of judges rather than
politicians. Rights claims implicate problems germane to moral philosophy rather than to politics. For instance, a theory of rights can
80 See generally Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (1985).
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be tested by imagining circumstances in which the theory would
produce unacceptable results and then revising the theory accordingly. 8 This type of analysis is likely to be performed in a far more
accurate manner by judges than by legislators or individual citizens.
Judges are free from political pressure, deciding cases on the basis
of reason and principle rather than expedient log-rolling.
This argument based on institutional expertise is not the only
justification offered for judicial review on the basis of rights. Other
arguments have suggested that judicial review has an important role
to play in heightening the awareness of rights issues amongst citizens
generally. The claim is that "rights talk" is a means of uplifting and
revitalizing political and moral discourse in our society generally. By
forcing the political process to confront the question of individual
rights, public morality will become more reflective and self-critical.8 2
The most commonly cited American example of this phenomenon
is the American Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of
Education 3 in 1954, a decision which made the issue of desegregation in public schools a major focus of public controversy. Cast as
the high priests of moral discourse, the judiciary encourages and
orchestrates meaningful public debate on moral issues.
These arguments based on fundamental rights have, however,
been the subject of extensive debate and critique in the American
literature. The critiques have focused on the spurious claims of
objectivity and elitism which underlie the fundamental rights position. Perhaps the most compelling critique has been that advanced
by John Hart Ely 4 Ely points out that there is no such thing as
one method of moral philosophy. For instance, the two most renowned contemporary theorists of moral and political philosophy,
John Rawis"5 and Robert Nozick,G reach radically different con-

clusions on the requirements of the just state. Given this indeterminacy in moral theory, the invitation to judges to act as moral
philosophers is a covert invitation for them to impose their own
values on the democracy. The values that will be deemed to be
fundamental will be the ones which seem most important to the
81 Dworkin, "Political judges and the Rule of Law", in A Matter of Principle
(1985) at 24.
82 For arguments to this effect, see M. Perry, supra, note 77; B. Ackerman,
Reconstructing American Law (1984).
83 Supra, note 22.
84

See J. Ely, supra, note 6 at 56-6o.

85 A Theory of Justice (197x).
80 Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
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upper middle, professional class from which most lawyers and
judges are drawn. Ely condemns such a practice as flagrantly elitist
and undemocratic:
Thus the values judges are likely to single out as fundamental, to the
extent that the selections do not simply reflect the political and
ethical predispositions of the individuals concerned, are likely to
have the smell of the lamp about them. They will be - and it would
be unreasonable to expect otherwise if the task is so defined - the
values of what Henry Hart without irony used to call "first-rate
lawyers".... Our society did not make the constitutional decision to
move to near-universal suffrage only to turn around and have superimposed on popular decisions the values of first rate lawyers11
Even if the decisions of judges did not systematically reflect this
narrow range of values, it would still be difficult to sustain the case
for the legitimacy of activist judicial review. The proponents of
activist judicial review are motivated by a profound distrust of the
political process on rights issues. They regard the messy compromises
of politics as simply inappropriate for determining individual rights;
rights are matters of individual entitlement, derived from a process
of reason and argument, and should not depend for their recognition
upon whether "the people" happen to recognize them or not. The
fallacy in the argument is the assumption that the justification for
democracy is that it is likely to produce objectively "right" answers.
Democratic politics is not guaranteed to produce right answers. No
matter how much debate and discussion is encouraged, there is still
the possibility that the community will make a choice that is meanspirited or unenlightened. This possibility seems implicit in the
democratic bargain. A choice for democracy means that the community has a right to be wrong. As Michael Walzer has observed,
"[t]he people's claim to rule does not rest upon their knowledge of
truth ... but in terms of who they are. They are the subjects of the

law, and if the law is to bind them as free men and women, they
must also be its makers."' The distinction that Walzer is drawing is
between having a right to decide and having the right answer.
Democracy assumes that the people have the former but not necessarily the latter.
There is a final, highly ironic objection to the fundamental rights
approach to judicial review. The irony lies in the fact that, while
these theorists claim to be the champions of principle, their own
87
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theories are remarkably unprincipled and ad hoc. The problem
arises in the following way. If judicial review was actually designed
to protect fundamental interests, the range of issues subject to judicial scrutiny would have to be radically expanded. Judicial review
would have to assume a leading role in defining individual entitlement to employment, housing or education, since all of these matters
are arguably fundamental to human development. Yet the judiciary
does not now purport to deal with these issues in any serious or
systematic fashion. This leaves the fundamental rights theorists with
a major problem: how can a fundamental rights analysis of judicial
review be justified when the range of interests which are deemed
fundamental is so obviously underinclusive? There are two possible
ways to deal with this problem of underinclusiveness, neither of
which is particularly satisfactory. On the one hand, the theorist can
arbitrarily narrow the class of interests which are deemed to be
fundamental, so that the protected class exactly appropriates the
current, restricted doctrinal categories. Alternatively, the theorist
can claim that large portions of current doctrine are mistaken and
that the range of constitutionally protected interests should be radically expanded. The difficulty with this latter strategy is that the
category of mistakes must remain limited and exceptional; otherwise, the theory is no longer an account of current doctrine but
rather a prescription for a whole new set of doctrinal understandings.
A serious attempt to apply a fundamental rights analysis and critique
to current American constitutional doctrine, for example, would
undoubtedly produce an unworkable and overwhelming category
of "mistakes".
These democratic objections to the judiciary enforcing a set of
fundamental values are as persuasive in the Canadian as in the
American context. But there are a series of additional, equally
compelling difficulties with any attempt to import this form of
judicial review into the Canadian setting. These difficulties arise
from a tension between the fundamental values assumptions and the
distinctive quality of the Canadian political tradition.
The assumptions underlying the fundamental values version of
judicial review are profoundly individualistic. The language of
"trump rights" encourages the belief that communities are nothing
more than aggregations of private interests. The rightholder is
defined by his separation from and opposition to the community as
opposed to his membership in it. This is exemplified by the assertion
that rights are designed to ensure that the state remains neutral on
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questions of the good life or of what gives value to life.ao Since the
citizens of the society hold radically different conceptions of what
gives value to life, the government must never take a stand on the
issue. It cannot justify a decision on the basis that some ways of
leading one's life are more worthy than others, "that it is more
worthwhile to look at Titian on the wall than watch a football game
on television. Perhaps it is more worthwhile to look at Titian, but
that is not the point".90
This rights-based ethic has an impoverished conception of communal politics. Attempts on the part of the community to define its
collective identity are automatically suspect. For the rights theorist,
wherever communities gather together to express their moral beliefs
in law, there lurks the stale but unmistakable odour of totalitarianism. Questions of morality and values are inescapably relative. Such
matters of taste must be left in the hands of the individual, freed
from the tyranny of the opinions of others regarding his lifestyle.
The constitutional analysis of Ronald Dworkin exemplifies this
impoverished conception of community with its corresponding emphasis on the privatization of morality. Dworkin's analysis is premised
on the notion that everyone has the right to be treated with equal
concern and respect. This concern for equality is violated when the
community allows a "corrupting" element to contaminate its calculation of general welfare. Dworkin identifies the corrupting element
as a reliance on external preferences, preferences people have about
what others shall do or have. External preferences are vulgar and
corrupt because they suppose that a particular form of life or community is more valuable than any other. Dworkin concludes that
judicial protection for fundamental rights is an attempt .to identify
those political decisions that are likely to reflect strong external preferences and remove them from majoritarian political institutions.
The implication of Dworkin's argument is that political debate is
purified when individuals frame arguments solely in terms of their
personal interests. Far from purifying utilitarian discourse, Dworkin's
proposal debases it. In the guise of offering a political discourse that
is neutral or egalitarian, Dworkin has simply ordained that only
certain values or ideals may be tolerated in political debate and
argument. The accepted dialect is that employed by individuals
bargaining in their own self interest. Any appeal to the values or
89 See Dworkin, "Liberalism" in A Matter of Principle (1985) x8x at 19x.
90 Dworkin, "Can a Liberal State Support Art?", in A Matter of Principle
(1985) 221 at 222.
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interests of the community as a whole is morally malformed. Apparently, to invoke public as opposed to purely private considerations is
to violate the norm of equal concern and respect.
The result is an aggregate of individuals secure in their abstract
rights and liberties but divorced from each other. This, of course, is
entirely predictable given the background theory of personality
which underlies contemporary liberal accounts of politics 1 The
common starting point of these accounts is an abstract and fictitious
choosing self which is stripped of all particularity. This abstract self
belongs to no particular family or community, has no set of allegiances or commitments and possesses no life plans. The quality of
this person's liberation is aptly captured by Michael Walzer: "I
imagine a human being thoroughly divorced, freed of parents, spouse
and children, watching pornographic performances in some dark
theater, joining (it may be his only membership) this or that odd
cult, which he will probably leave in a month or two for another
still odder."92
In a recent essay, Dworkin has attempted to qualify the prohibition he would place on the use of external preferences in political
debate and argument.93 The revised thesis would prohibit use of
external preferences only in the sense that the mere existence or
popularity of those preferences cannot be counted as a reason in
their favour. On this basis, Dworkin explains that it was proper to
count the disinterested political preferences of liberals that tipped
the balance in favour of repealing laws against homosexual relationships in England in 1967. Although these preferences might have
been external, the liberals "expressed their own political preferences
in their votes and arguments, but they did not appeal to the popularity of these preferences as providing an argument in itself for
what they wanted."9' 4 The point seems to be that the case for reform
would have been just as strong had there been very few heterosexuals in favour of reform even though, as a practical matter, reform
might have been impossible.
This qualification seems to collapse the argument into a crude
assertion along the following lines: one should only count those
91 See M. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (1982), discussing
Rawls, supra, note 85.
02 M. Walzer, Radical Principles (x98o) at 6.
03 See Dworkin, "Do We Have A Right to Pornography?", in A Matter of
Principle (x985) 335 at 365-72.
04 Ibid. at 368.
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views which are liberal, and therefore correct, while discounting any
contrary views. This argument claims that conservative arguments
depend on the popularity of the views in question, as opposed to the
inherent correctness of those views. Conservative opponents of reform however, would have appealed to the same class of arguments
as did liberals; their argument would have been one of principle,
based on the assertion that homosexual relationships were morally
wrong. Like liberals, conservatives would have regarded the case for
continued criminalization of homosexuality to be just as compelling,
regardless of the relative popularity of their views. Thus the suggestion that one can distinguish conservative views from liberal ones
based on the fact that the former appeals to the popularity of the
views while the latter does not is unfounded.
It would be possible to argue that this individualistic political
philosophy is undesirable on its own terms. The basic objection
would be that it stunts the possibility of developing a set of shared
ends and values, a precondition to the emergence of a genuine
populist democratic practice. But the objection which I want to
emphasize is a much more limited and modest one. My claim is
that there is a tension between this individualist ideology and the
Canadian political tradition and, for that reason alone, this ideology
ought not to form the basis of judicial review under the Charter.
C. The CanadianTory Touch: The CanadianPolitical Tradition
Despite the ongoing Canadian identity crisis, social and political
theorists claim to have discovered important and enduring differences between Canadian and American political culture. The differences are said to flow from a distinction between "individualist" and
"collectivist" visions of the relationship between individual and
society. 5 For an individualist, life is the individual pursuit of happiness rather than membership in a body politic. All roads converge
on the atomic, prepolitical individual maximizing his or her selfinterest. Thus social contract theorists like Hobbes and Locke justified the creation of the state by analogy to a self-interested bargain
between autonomous individuals in a state of nature. There was
little emphasis on the possibility of the state helping to forge communal values or common ends. The state was necessary merely as a
means of establishing order in a universe in which the interests of
95 See generally, G. Horowitz, "Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in
Canada: An Interpretation" (1966) 32 Can. J. of Econ. & Pol. Sci. 143.
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rational maximizers inevitably collided with each other.' Restraint
was contractual rather than natural.
Within collectivism, individuals are defined by their membership
in an organic community. Society is primarily a community of
hierarchically organized classes or groups, rather than an association
of a priori free individuals. The good of the individual is not conceivable apart from some regard for the good of the whole. Thus,
restraints on individuals are natural rather than contractual, flowing
from the very duties and rights which are implicit in membership in
a larger community.
In general terms, the dominant ideology in both Canada and the
United States can be described as essentially liberal or "individualist". But the broad similarities between the two societies should not
lead one to minimize the important differences between them.
Although Canada is broadly liberal, there are important features of
the Canadian political tradition which cannot be placed within a
purely individualist framework. The most prominent of these features is the fact that socialism in Canada is a national political force,
whereas in the United States, organized socialism is dead." The
significance of socialist ideas is particularly pronounced in provincial
politics, where the CCF-NDP parties have formed governments in
three provinces; in the national arena, the NDP has never been able
to achieve the status of a major urban party, but it has succeeded in
becoming a significant minor party. The presence of these socialist
ideas is an indication of the ideological diversity in the Canadian
political tradition, particularly the legitimacy accorded collectivist
or organic conceptions of society. Socialism is an ideology which
combines collectivist ideas with rationalist and egalitarian ones;
"[i]t is because socialists have a conception of society as more than
an agglomeration of competing individuals - a conception close to
the tory view of society as an organic community - that they find
the liberal idea of equality (equality of opportunity) inadequate." 98
Socialists see classes and communities in addition to isolated individuals maximizing opportunities for personal growth. They reject
the liberal vision of abstract, bloodless individuals, situated in some
situation of hypothetical choice, detached from the actual communities in which they live and work.
90 See generally, C. MacPherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy

(1977); C. MacPherson, Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (1973).
97 See generally, Horowitz, supra, note 95.
93 Ibid. at x44.
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The presence of socialism is not the only feature of the Canadian
political tradition which belies the exclusivity of liberal individualism. "Tory" values of "ascription" and "elitism" played a much
more significant role in Canada's development than in America's. 0
Unlike America, Canada never had a lawless and egalitarian frontier. There has been a weaker Canadian emphasis on social equality
and a greater acceptance by individuals of the facts of economic
inequality and social hierarchy. Thus, in Canada, the Family Compacts were able to maintain their grip on political life long after the
easy victory of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy in the United
States. Even after the achievement of responsible government, "there
was no complete repudiation of the Compacts and what they stood
for."'0 0 There continued to be a greater acceptance of limitations and
of heirarchical patterns, as well as a distrust of American republicanism and democracy. Moreover, Canadian political elites have been
far more willing than their American counterparts to use the state
for controlling and directing economic development. Perhaps the
most articulate and passionate celebration of these Canadian conservative values is George Grant's famous essay Lament for a
Nation. For Grant, the United States was a society which was
devoted to the rights of the individual above the common good and
espoused freedom above order and authority. Canada, on the other
hand, stood "in firm opposition to the Jeffersonian liberalism so
dominant in the United States".' Canadians were less enamoured
of change, technology and materialism than their American counterparts. In Canada, tradition, order and stability were important
virtues of political life. Other commentators do not share Grant's
profound commitment to conservative values, but nevertheless conclude that Canada is a society tinged with a "tory touch":' 2 "In
English Canada ideological diversity has not been buried beneath
an absolutist liberal nationalism. Here Locke is not the one true
god; he must tolerate lesser tory and socialist deities at his side."'0 3
There is no universal agreement as to what accounts for the
"tory", or more recently the socialist, touch in Canadian politics.
99 See S. Lipset, The First New Nation (1963).
100 K. McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" in L. Hartz, The Founding of New Societies (2964) at 239.
101 G. Grant, Lament for at Nation (x965) at 33102 Ibid.; see also R. Whitaker, "Images of the State in Canada" in L. Panitch,
ed., The CanadianState; PoliticalEconomy and Political Power (1977) at
28; G. Horowitz, CanadianLabour in Politics (1968).
.03 Supra, note 95 at 155.
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Perhaps the most influential explanation has been that offered by
Gad Horowitz, who has argued that Canadian liberalism and conservatism interacted in a dialectical fashion to produce socialism.""
This dialectical hypothesis depicts Canada as a fragment society
with predominantly bourgeois roots,"0 5 but with non-liberal imperfections which eventually produced soci~lism. Other writers have
attempted to offer an economic or materialist explanation for the
development of Canadian political culture. Thus, Tom Naylor suggests that toryism in Canada is a product of the underdevelopment
of Canada as an industrialist capitalist political economy.' According to Naylor's thesis, the Canadian bourgeoisie has always been
dominated by mercantile and financial elements, which are less
entrepreneurial and are more willing to work through the state to
enforce their position: "[T]he willingness of Canadian elites to use
the state ...to control and develop the economy is not the con-

sequence of [tory ideology], but its cause."' 0 7 Finally, other observers
have advanced the more prosaic explanation that the strength of
Canadian socialism is due primarily to our close relationship with
Great Britain which made it easy for British ideas to be imported
and accepted. 0
Whatever the explanation, the important point for present purposes is that Canadian political culture cannot be portrayed as uniformly individualist. The Canadian polity has a rich and continuing
commitment to collectivist, organic values in addition to individualist
ones. This heterogeneity has important implications for the nature
of judicial review under the Charter. With the enactment of the
104
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Ibid. See also "Notes on 'Conservatism, Liberalism and Socialism in Canada' " (1978) 11 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 383. For a critique of the Horowitz thesis,
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Charter,there is a danger that Canadian jurists and lawyers will
uncritically embrace American assumptions about the nature and
function of judicial review. But this would be a mistake. American
approaches to fundamental rights have been developed in a political
culture that is quite different from our own. To rely, in some wholesale and uncritical fashion, on the answers that American courts and
commentators have given to problems of individual rights would be
to deny the distinctiveness of the Canadian tradition. Importation
of the American model of judicial review without significant design
modifications would be to marginalize the enterprise. General Motors
may be able to ignore the Canadian-American border, but Ronald
Dworkin cannot; approaches to judicial review in Canada must
necessarily differ from those in the United States.
This result flows from the very nature of constitutions and of
constitutional adjudication. The enactment of a constitution is a
momentous instant in the life of a polity. It is a moment in which
the community attempts to articulate those values which are most
fundamental and which constitute its identity as a community. Judicial review is the process which seeks to mediate and interpret the
values identified at that constitutional moment for future generations. Thus, the whole premise and justification of constitutional
adjudication under the Charter is that it gives expression to fundamental Canadian values as opposed to fundamental American,
British or European ones. This does not mean that this expression
and interpretation of values need be static or backward looking. As
Alasdair MacIntyre has emphasized, a tradition is a "living tradition" to the extent that the heritage of the past is modified and
reconstituted in the present:
[A]ll reasoning takes place within the context of some traditional
mode of thought, transcending through criticism and invention the
limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition; this
is as true of modem physics as of medieval logic. Moreover when a
tradition is in good order, it is always partially constituted by an
argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose ... [A]n adequate sense of
tradition manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities which
the past has made available to the present. Living traditions, just
because they constitute a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a
future whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it
possesses any, derives from the past. 10 9
109 A. MacIntyre, After Virtue (I98i)

at 2o6-07.
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This suggests that the profoundly individualistic philosophies of
Ronald Dworkin and other American fundamental rights theorists
are an inapt and foreign foundation for judical review under the
Canadian Charter. Constitutional adjudication in Canada must
accommodate the communitarian and collectivist aspects of our
cultural tradition as well as the individualist ones. It must regard
attempts by the community to embody its fundamental beliefs in
law as something more than the imposition of one person's external
preferences on another. Judicial review in Canada must be more
than another branch-plant operation of an American head office.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DEMOCRACY
We return, once again, to our point of departure; given the political character of constitutional adjudication under the Charter,
what are the values which should guide Canadian judges as they
give meaning to its open-ended provisions? The proposal which I
want to advance and defend is neither complex nor novel. Its virtue
lies in the fact that it offers a response and a resolution to many of
the objections to judical review outlined in the previous section. In
particular, it is a conception of judical review which places a
premium on values of community, values which are central to the
Canadian political tradition. At its most abstract level, the proposal
is that Canadian judges should interpret the Charter to reinforce
and protect values associated with democracy. The concern of
judges should be with the way in which decisions have been reached
rather than with the substantive fairness of the decisions themselves.
Constitutional adjudication should be performed in the name of
democracy rather than in the name of right answers.
At first blush, this proposal appears to present more difficulties
than solutions. An instruction to protect democratic values seems
hopelessly vague, almost meaningless. Democracy is far from a precise concept and there is much disagreement over what procedures
qualify as democratic."' Moreover, a recent American attempt to
defend a similar theory of judicial review has been met with widespread and effective criticism."1 1 It would seem that any attempt to
construct a theory of judicial review under the Charter on a similar
See Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle" in A Matter of Principle (z985)
33 at 59.
.11 Of course, I refer to the work of J. Ely, supra, note 6. For some of the more
punishing critiques of Ely, see Dworkin and Tribe, both supra, note 7.
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basis would be to rework soil that has been well-tilled and already
found to be barren.
Despite these important initial reservations, a theory of judicial
review based on democratic values continues to hold certain attractions. The most important of these is that such a theory seems to
resolve the classic and continuing tension between judicial review
and democracy, the single issue which has dominated American
constitutional thinking for the past twenty-five years. Far from
derogating from democracy, judicial review under such a conception would be in aid of it. With such potential, a theory of judicial
review based on the idea of democracy itself merits close attention.
A. Process versus Substance
In the recent American constitutional literature, John Hart Ely's
work stands out; he alone has fashioned a defence of judicial review
based on democratic values.1 ' His theory builds on the distinction
between substance and procedure. For Ely, democracy means that
the choice of substantive political values must be made by representatives of the people rather than by unelected judges. The role of
the judiciary should be to police the process of democracy rather
than its substance. The court should intervene, not to vindicate
particular substantive values it has determined are important or
fundamental, but rather "to ensure that the political process which is where such values are properly identified, weighed, and
accommodated - is open to those of all viewpoints on something
approaching an equal basis."' "3 This means making sure that the
avenues of participation remain open and that legislation which
discriminates against discrete and insular minorities not be permitted.
This distinction between substance and procedure has proven to
be the weak link in Ely's argument and the focus for the attacks of
his critics. In one of the most punishing critiques, Lawrence Tribe
has argued that if process values are seen as primary, this can only
m " 4 We value process,
be because they are themselves substantive
according to Tribe, for its intrinsic characteristics; it gives expression to "a right to individual dignity, or some similarly substantive
norm". 5 Moreover, not only are process values substantive, in
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applying process values courts must necessarily make substantive
value choices. For instance, in applying the equal protection clause,
"[a]ny constitutional distinction between laws burdening homosexuals and laws burdening exhibitionists ...must depend on a

substantive theory of which [group is] exercising fundamental rights
and which [is] not."'1 Finally, Tribe argues that considerations of
substance are more fundamental than those of process. A narrow
concentration on process may lead us to accept decisions whose
effects strike us as substantively obnoxious. Tribe also believes that
there are certain constitutional provisions, particularly the equal
protection clause, which ought to be fully explored rather than
artificially made to fit the mold of process values. This critique of
the distinction between procedural and substantive values pulled
the carpet out from under Ely's feet. He could no longer claim that
his theory reserved questions of substantive values to the democratic
legislature, while asking the judiciary to deal only with questions of
process. The critics had demonstrated that, on Ely's own premises,
courts would still be forced to make substantive determinations on
issues of political morality. By Ely's own admission, the courts had
no business making such substantive choices. He had been hoist on
his own petard.
Yet it is possible to begin the analysis from the opposite direction.
This alternative starting point assumes that judges interpreting a
fundamental constitutional document must inevitably make substantive political choices. This starting point is by no means incompatible with drawing the following fundamental distinction between
two very different types of instructions which might be issued to
judges interpreting a constitution. The first instruction would direct
the court to attend to the outcomes of the political decisions which
came before it. The issue in any constitutional case would be whether
the court regarded those outcomes as substantively just or right. The
second instruction would direct the court to focus its attention on
the way in which the outcomes had been produced as opposed to
whether the outcomes were substantively just. On this second view,
the issue for the court would be whether the process which had
produced the decision in question had conformed to democratic
values.
In either alternative, the court would be drawn into making
determinations of substantive political morality. But this does not
count as an argument in favour of giving the first instruction to
116 Ibid. at
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U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

VOL. 21:1

judges as opposed to the second. The mere fact that judges must
make substantive choices is completely neutral in terms of whether
judges ought to heed political outcomes as opposed to the way in
which those outcomes are produced. In order to choose between
these alternative conceptions of judicial review, it is necessary to
construct an independent normative argument that does not depend
on the mere fact that constitutional adjudication is substantive.
There are two such normative arguments available, both of which
argue in favour of a theory of judicial review based on process. The
first argument stems from the value of democracy itself. Democracy
regards consent as the only legitimate basis for the exercise of state
power. Either the people themselves or their accountable representatives should have responsibility for making political choices. This
procedural theory regards judicial review as a mechanism to protect
existing opportunities for democratic debate and to open new
avenues for such debate.
A theory of judicial review based on outcomes, on the other hand,
is designed to circumscribe and to bypass the political process. By
inviting judges to test the substantive fairness of political outcomes
against some independent normative standard, the opportunities for
popular participation and control are limited. Rather than encouraging individuals to debate and define the conditions of their communal life, conflict is arbitrated by deferring to an elite judiciary.
In attempting to avoid the tyranny of the majority, it mistakenly
embraces a doctrine of expertise and dependency which carries with
it a subtle yet despotic dominion of its own.
A second argument in favour of the procedural conception of
judicial review is based on the related value of community. On the
procedural theory, communities are not mere aggregations of private
interests. The rightholder is identified, in an important if not exclusive sense, by his membership in a community. Democratic debate
and dialogue is valued not because it will necessarily yield right
answers to issues of political morality, but at least partly because it
is a necessary feature of a community developing its own identity.
This perspective values the process whereby citizens define their
own traditions, conventions and expectations as opposed to seeking
to emulate the choices of the inhabitants of some ideal or hypothetical commonwealth. It is a choice, as Michael Walzer has asserted,
for politics and pluralism over universal truth; a community's particular experiences "are valued by the people over the philosopher's
gifts because they belong to the people and the gifts do not - much
as I might value some familiar and much-used possession and feel
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uneasy with a new, more perfect model.""
Of course, it is this
emphasis on values of community which has been an important
distinguishing feature of the Canadian political tradition.
There is an important theoretical objection which might be raised
against the democratic conception of judicial review. This objection
is that the idea of democracy is itself so vague and indeterminate
that it could hardly serve as the basis for a rich and developed
theory of judicial review. In effect, the objection is that the democratic conception of judicial review is internally incoherent and
logically unattainable. In the next section, I explain why I find this
objection unconvincing; theoretically at least, the democratic conception is coherent and possible. I then turn to an examination of
the Charter, in order to determine whether this model of judicial
review offers a convincing account of the principles which underlie
the document.

B. The Democratic Ideal
Few concepts in political theory are more contested than that of
democracy. Much current controversy centres over the extent to
which democracy requires citizen participation in making decisions
which affect their lives. The current practice of democracy certainly
gives rather limited expression to this participatory ideal. Rather
than make decisions themselves, citizens in modern democracies
simply choose the experts or representatives who will make such
decisions on their behalf. The great challenge for modern democratic
theory has been to justify the highly elitist character of contemporary
democratic practice.
A variety of justifications have been offered, most of them centering on the "realism" of representative forms of democracy."' The
starting point of such arguments is Robert Dahl's observation that
"Homo Civicus is not by nature a political animal"." 9 The vast
majority of citizens are largely apathetic about public affairs.' 20
Those individuals who do engage in the minimal political act of
voting do not engage in a rational, informed analysis of the issues;
317

Walzer, supra, note 88 at 395.

I's The classic defence of representative democracy remains the work of Joseph
Schumpeter. See J. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
(943). For other writing in this tradition, see R. Dahl, Voting (954);
R. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (1956).
220 R. Dahl, Who Governs? (s96i) at 225.
120 See, for example, S. Verba & N. Nie, Participationin America (1972); W.
Mishler, PoliticalParticipationin Canada (1979).
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rather, voting studies have consistently confirmed that questions of
party loyalty, candidates' personalities, prejudice and custom are
the chief determinants of voter choice. Moreover, elite theorists
regard the low levels of citizen participation and interest as desirable.
There is strong evidence to suggest that mass publics are less sympathetic to democratic norms and individual rights than are political
elites.121 If participation were increased, it is argued that the result
would be to exacerbate political tensions and jeopardize political
stability. Elite theorists claim that it is far better to leave important
political decisions to an informed and tolerant elite which is somewhat insulated from the vulgar and authoritarian attitudes of individual citizens. Such analyses have been particularly influential in
Canadian political theory; it has been argued that the leaders of
Canada's various ethnic groups have sought bargains at the elite
level in an effort to avoid conflicts among the masses of the various
subcultures.12
Critics of representative democracy have charged that this limited
public participation is neither necessary nor desirable. 3 They have
lamented the disappearance of the classical Greek notion of public
freedom -the belief that individuals should take responsibility for
12
creating and changing the terms on which they lead their lives. '
The source of the trouble is said to be the proliferation of private
and introspective conceptions of freedom. Freedom is commonly
conceived of as nothing more than the absence of restraint, as "an
inner realm into which men might escape at will from the pressures
of the world."' 22 This purely negative conception of freedom has
cheapened and trivialized its meaning. Instead of continuing to view
freedom as protection for our private lives, Arendt and others urge
us to recapture a forgotten, alternative vision of the idea; freedom
as active participation in public decision making. The truncated
character of the contemporary vision of freedom has made the task
of creating shared, reflective public values an impossibility. In short,
it has undermined values of community in favour of an empty cult
of privatism.
121 See H. McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics"
222
123
124
125

(1964)

58 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 361 at 375.
See R. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in CanadianPolitics (973).
See, for example, H. Arendt, On Revolution (1963); C. Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (1970).
See G. Frug, "The City as a Legal Concept" (x98o) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057
at xo68.
Arendt, supra, note 123 at 120-21.
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Given these radically different visions of democracy, it may be
surprising to discover that many of the differences between these
competing positions are empirical in nature. A central issue in dispute is the causes and consequences of citizen participation in contemporary democracy. The basic contention of elite theorists is that
apathy and authoritarianism are natural and inevitable; increased
participation is both impractical and dangerous. Participatory democrats, in contrast, maintain that apathy is learned rather than
natural and that increased citizen participation would contribute to
individual empowerment without endangering social stability. Such
empirical assertions may be tested. Indeed, there is an extensive
body of social science evidence which confirms the observations of
elite theorists with respect to the behaviour of an average citizen.
Historically, citizen participation in Canada has been limited
primarily to voting, with less than one quarter of the eligible popula12 6
tion participating in more intensive forms of political activity.
Concentration on average levels of participation, however, obscures
the fact that there are significant differences in the levels of participation of various identifiable groups in Canadian society. Social
standing, ethnicity, religion, sex and age are all effective predictors
of one's level of political participation."2 ' The higher an individual's
occupation, income and education, the more likely it is that he or
she will participate in politics. Citizens of Anglo-Celtic descent
participate more extensively in most areas of political life. Women
participate less than men in virtually every form of political activity.
In terms of age, those from 35 to 65 participate more extensively
than do older citizens or those aged 21 to 35What this suggests is the levels of political participation are
learned rather than given. There is nothing inherent in human
nature which tends towards apathy and public disinterest. Levels of
political participation are the products of human experience and
motivation rather than biological necessity. Moreover, there appears
to be a strong relationship between the quantity of citizen participation and its quality. Those citizens who participate the most exhibit
the highest levels of political tolerance and tend to be better informed about issues of public policy. Conversely, prejudice and
dogmatism have been found to be most prevalent amongst those
126
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least active in politicsY The relationship between political efficacy
and participation has been confirmed by studies of democracy in
"non-political" settings, such as the family, the school and the
workplace. Citizens who are given the opportunity to participate in
decisionmaking in these settings are likely to carry a generalized
sense of personal competence into the political sphere." Thus,
participation by untrained and inexpert citizens does not breed mob
rule. Rather, it increases the individual's self esteem while prompting
tolerance and respect for the interests of the community as a whole.
This empirical evidence suggests the possibility of discovering
some common ground between the defenders and the critics of current forms of representative government. The starting point of the
analysis would be the current practice and understanding of democracy rather than some utopian, classical democratic community.
Thus the analysis would accept the proposition that professional
politicians and bureaucrats will continue to be responsible for the
day-to-day management of public policy. But the widespread citizen
apathy and ignorance which characterizes contemporary liberal
democracies would still be lamented rather than praised. The common ground between the competing theories of democracy would
be a recognition of the positive value of citizen participation for the
polity. Citizen participation would be valued for its role in producing better informed and tolerant citizens. It would also be seen as a
means of ensuring greater responsiveness on the part of state officials
to the needs and desires of the public as a whole. In essence, this
approach would accept the proposition that issues of public policy
may be properly delegated to professional politicians and officials,
but it would seek to enhance the opportunities for popular debate,
argument and accountability. Citizen involvement would be encouraged in political activities which were more intensive than
voting. It would also support participation in such non-political
settings as the family, school and workplace as a means of encouraging political efficacy and education.
Although this hybrid conception of democratic politics may be
less radical than other proposals, it nevertheless possesses very deep
128
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critical power. The power of the theory flows from the fact that the
average Canadian citizen has relatively little awareness or understanding of issues of public policy. This lack of accountability and
democratic responsiveness is exacerbated by the significant differences in the levels of participation of various groups and interests.
What are the implications of this hybrid theory based on current
democratic practices for the practice of judicial review? On one
view, the logical implication would be for the judiciary to assume
the task of wholly reconstituting the nature and practice of democracy. For instance, given the widespread evidence that levels of
political participation decline with social and economic status,'3 ° it
will be necessary for the judiciary to provide citizens with the
material and intellectual resources to enable them to participate
fully in the democratic process. One implication is that the judiciary
should read into the constitution a set of welfare rights which
guarantee minimum levels of income, housing and education. A
number of American writers have argued in favour of such welfare
rights on the basis that without a minimum level of material
resources, problems of unequal access will never be overcome.
Yet this welfare rights approach of judicial review is neither
logical nor desirable in principle. The difficulty is that constitutionalizing such rights would vastly limit the scope for democratic
debate and dialogue rather than expand it. The judiciary, rather
than the legislature, would have to assume responsibility for defining
the scope and character of the welfare system. It would have to
determine how much money to allocate to social programs and the
tradeoffs between such programs and other measures in the government's budget. Once the judiciary embarked on such a project
there would be no turning back. Ultimately, budgets and tax measures would have to be drafted by judges and lawyers rather than
the legislature. It is precisely this result that the procedural approach
to judicial review was designed to avoid in the first place. Moreover, the welfare rights approach ignores the historical fact that it
has always been legislatures rather than courts which have taken
the initiative in improving equal political access. Elected representatives, acting through the democratic process, have been responsible for putting in place the basic elements of the modern welfare
state. The judiciary, far from promoting such redistributive or social
welfare measures, has often been keen to block them. Thus the basic
responsibility for improving equal access and participation should
130 See R. Dahi, Democracy in the United States, 3d ed. (x976) at 45
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remain with the legislature rather than the courts, in keeping with
the historical record.
Judicial review, especially under the Charter, should be structured around two general principles. These two principles are analogous to those underlying John Ely's analysis, but they differ from
his approach in certain important respects. The first principle is a
right of equal access and participation in the political system. In
one sense, this first principle parallels Dean Ely's concern that those
in power must not be permitted to impair the formal access of citizens to the political process. The court must protect the basic infrastructure of liberal democracy - rights of assembly, debate, free
elections; no citizen may be excluded from participation in the
process of collective debate and argument except on compelling
grounds. But this first principle must not be interpreted in purely
formal and negative terms. The court's analysis must take account
of the fact that formal access does not guarantee equal access; moreover, it must appreciate the particular concern of legislatures in the
past to bridge the gap between formal and effective rights of access.
The state does not act merely to impair freedom, but also to
ameliorate it. Freedom is not just absence of restraint, but the
ability to effectively participate in collective decision making. This
suggests that where the state acts in such a way as to improve equal
access, there should be a strong presumption in favour of the constitutional validity of such a measure.
The second principle is one of equality. The concern is not with
the substantive equality of the outcomes of the policy process but
with the manner in which the decisions or outcomes were produced.
But in what way could the process of decisionmaking, as opposed to
the outcomes themselves, be said to violate a norm of equality?
Dean Ely, in struggling with this difficult issue, formulated an
answer based on the concept of prejudice. While acknowledging that
"prejudice" was a "mushword", he suggested that the core notion
of prejuidce was a "lens that distorts reality". 3' We act out of
prejudice when we inflict inequality for its own sake, "to treat a
group worse not in the service of some overriding social goal but
largely for the sake of simply disadvantaging its members".' Ely
argues that we are likely to develop such prejudice against a minority
which is "discrete and insular". Where there is little social contact
131 Ely, supra, note 6 at 153.
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between the minority and society as a whole, it is likely that unjustified stereotypical generalizations about their characteristics will arise.
Yet the concept of prejudice seems a rather implausible basis for
argument under an equal protection guarantee. It requires a court
to inquire into the motives behind legislation and make extremely
fine distinctions. How, for example, is the court to distinguish
between prejudice on the one hand and a simple preference for
one's own interests over those of the minority on the other? There
seem to be relatively few public policy choices which inflict harm
for its own sake; most choices prefer the interests of certain groups
at the expense of those of others. Nor can it be said that, in instances
where the inequality between two groups is very great, the advantaged group is imposing burdens on the basis of prejudice. In principle, there is no constraint on the social cost which a special interest
group will find it expedient to impose on other groups in society in
the course of obtaining a larger share of output for itself.' 33 A finding
of prejudice seems little more than a rhetorical, perjorative construct
which legitimizes overturning legislative choices with which judges
happen to disagree.
The empty character of the prejudice criterion is exemplified by
the fact that Ely himself appears to abandon it in his discussion of
whether particular groups qualify as discrete and insular minorities.
For instance, in the case of women, Ely does not claim that they
have been the victims of harm inflicted for its own sake. Rather, he
suggests that the trouble is that women have been operating at an
unfair disadvantage in the political process. They have largely been
excluded from the political process, which has been pervasively
dominated by men."' He concludes, however, that this exclusion
has largely been a historical phenomenon and that any lack of
participation by women in the ig8os must be due to their own
conscious choice:
On this score it seems important that today discussion about the
appropriate 'place' of women is common among both women and
men, and between the sexes as well. The very stereotypes that gave
rise to laws 'protecting' women by barring them from various activities are under daily and publicized attack and are the subject of
equally spirited defense ... Given such open discussion of the traditional stereotypes, the claim that the numerical majority is being
'dominated', that women are in effect 'slaves' who have no realistic
133
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choice but to assimilate the stereotypes, is one it has become impos-

sible to maintain except at the most inflated rhetorical level. 35
It is no doubt true that many of the existing stereotypes about
women are under attack in both popular and elite circles. Nevertheless, social and economic inequality between the sexes remains a
pervasive fact of North American society in the I98os. The underlying social and economic position of women may have improved
over the past twenty-five years, but it remains vastly inferior to that
of men according to virtually all measures. The continuing unequal
status of women may have relatively little to do with motives such
as prejudice and much more to do with more observable factors
such as access and participation in the political process.
As was indicated above, women continue to participate less extensively in the political process than do men, although the gap between
the sexes is generally narrowing. The gap in participation rates
remains particularly stark in terms of the number of women seeking
and securing public office. Women remain the most underrepresented
group in elected assemblies today.' Elected women become rarer
as one moves from the level of municipal politics to the federal
level. On the federal level, although the number of women running
for office doubled from 1972 to 1979, less than fourteen percent of

the candidates in the 1979 general election were women. Less than
one in ten women running for federal office in the I 970s was elected,
as opposed to a success rate of one in five for male candidates. This
unequal success rate was not a product of "false consciousness" on
the part of women who, after all, comprise approximately half the
electorate. An analysis of the 1979 election traced the failure of
women to get elected to two factors." 7 First, the pattern of recruitment by the major parties was such that women tended to be
nominated in so-called lost cause ridings, where the party had little
prospects for success. Second, there was a substantial increase in the
number of women contesting election as independents with little
realistic chance of winning. The situation of women is merely a
special case of the more general phenomenon outlined earlier in this
section; rates of political participation vary considerably based on
135 Ibid. at 166.

136 M. Brodie, "The Recruitment of Canadian Women Provincial Legislators,
1950-75" (1977) 2 Atlantis 6; M. Brodie & J. Vickers, "The More Things
Change ... Women in the 1979 Federal Campaign" in H. Penniman, ed.,
Canada at the Polls z979 and z98o:A Study of the General Elections (5985)
at 322.

-37 Brodie & Vickers, supra, note 536 at 326-27.
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factors such as ethnicity, social status, age and gender. This suggests
an alternative conception of the equality norm in a procedural
theory of judicial review.
In this alternative view the norm of equality is designed to take
account of the fact that certain groups and individuals possess
unequal access to the political system. Despite guarantees of formal
access, certain factions may nevertheless come to enjoy a de facto
monopoly over state power, excluding certain minorities from effective participation in the system. The equality norm is an attempt to
counter the presence of these systemic but subtle defects in the
process; it claims that it is appropriate for the judiciary to subject
decisions reached through such a tainted process to a heightened
standard of review.
For this theory of a new equality norm to be plausible, it is necessary to make an important assumption about the relationship
between political participation and the outcomes of the policy
process. Simply put, the assumption is that participation makes a
difference. The argument is that the political process will tend to
ignore or to discount the interests of those who are unequally represented. Similarly, the process will tend to favour the interests of
those groups who are most vocal and politically active. The argument is captured by John Stuart Mill, who observed that "in the
absence of its natural defenders, the interest of the excluded is
always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen
with very different eyes from those of the person whom it directly
138
concerns."
There is relatively little empirical evidence regarding the consequences of participation for public policy, but there are strong
theoretical reasons for assuming that varying rates of political participation and awareness will have an impact on the policy process.
Recent studies of the policy process have advanced a model of
political rationality to explain public choices.'" According to this
model, impersonal considerations such as technical efficiency offer
relatively weak predictors of public policy. The model of political
rationality predicts that politicians will seek outcomes which will
maximize their own interests, namely, the likelihood of their securing
re-election. This model would suggest that even relatively modest
138
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changes in the composition of the politically active segments in
society would stimulate significant changes in government priorities.
The evidence which is available suggests that participation does
matter and that government is most responsive to the interests of
those who participate the most extensively and in the most demanding political activities. 4" For example, the gradual expansion of
opportunities for working-class participation in political life has
induced greater attention to the interests of the disadvantaged,
particularly in provinces where the CCF-NDP has constituted a
major party. My claim is not that the state will always and everywhere favour the interests of the politically powerful while ignoring
those of the politically inactive or uninformed. There is no crude,
determinist conspiracy at work here. The point is simply that differential rates of participation constitute a crucial and systemic factor
in the political process.
The principle of equality of access offers a far more convincing
explanation of American equal protection doctrine than does a
theory based on the indeterminate notion of prejudice. Consider
the issue of racial equality, the central and continuing focus of equal
protection doctrine. According to Ely's analysis, the court can
identify legislation which violates the norm of racial equality by
examining the motivation underlying racially discriminatory legislation. Legislation which is enacted in order to inflict harm for its own
sake violates the norm of equality, while legislation which simply
prefers the interests of certain racial groups at the expense of others
is the normal and legitimate product of the political system. The
first difficulty with this claim has already been pointed out in our
discussion of gender; because all legislation prefers the interests of
certain groups over those of others, it is impossible to identify legislation which inflicts harm solely for its own sake. Yet even if the distinction were meaningful, why should the issue of motivation prove
conclusive? Surely all laws which single out certain racial minorities
for discriminatory treatment are suspect, not simply a narrow class
of laws which inflict harm for its own sake. The reason why all
such discriminatory laws are suspect is that certain racial minorities
have historically been denied equal access to the political system.
The absence of equal access has this important implication: it does
not matter whether the discriminatory legislation was enacted out
4o See W. Mishler, "Political Participation and Democracy-, in M. Whitting-

ton & G. Williams, eds., Canadian Politics in the z98os (598!)
138-39.
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of a simple preference for the interests of the majority over those of
the minority, or whether it was motivated by prejudice. In either
event, the legislation is the tainted fruit of a tainted process. The
disadvantaged minority did not have an equal voice in the process
and for this reason it is illegitimate for the majority to have disregarded the minority's interests.
The notion that equal protection analysis should be triggered by
unequal access to the political process is by no means a simple or
mechanical concept. It still requires the judiciary to make substantive judgments of political morality, but it avoids a pointless and
elusive inquiry into the motivation behind racially discriminatory
legislation. Moreover, it illuminates more recent developments in
American equal protection analysis. The extension of heightened
judicial scrutiny to classifications based on gender seems a response
to the fact that women, like blacks and other racial minorities, have
lacked an equal voice in the political process. Moreover, the criteria
of political access offers a principled basis for holding that affirmative action programs do not violate the constitutional norm of
equality. It is true that such programs discriminate against certain
groups or individuals on the basis of racial criteria. But the difference is that the groups or individuals who stand to lose through
affirmative action programs have never been denied access to the
political system. Rather, they are individuals like Allan Bakke, a
white male whose interests have historically been vastly overrepresented in the political process. If the legislature determines that the
interests of someone in Allan Bakke's position must give way in the
face of the claims of certain racial minorities, Mr. Bakke has no
basis for a constitutional complaint.
Of course, the question of affirmative action was dealt with explicitly in the Canadian Charter. Section 15(2) provides that the
guarantee of equality rights in s. i(i)
does not preclude programs
designed to ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged individuals
or groups. It is comforting to discover that s. 15(2) can be explained
and justified on principled rather than expedient grounds. In addition, the analysis advanced here offers some basis for distinguishing
those groups which should be deemed to be disadvantaged for
purposes of s. 15(2). In short, the principle of equal access to the
political system constitutes the background purpose of both ss. 15 ( I )
and 15(2) of the Charter. Reliance on this principle will not eliminate doctrinal ambiguity. But it will enable the courts to coherently sort through the mass of confficting claims that are certain to
arise under the equality clause.

U.B.C. LAW REVIEW

C.

VOL. 21:1

Understanding the Charter

The argument to this point has been theoretical rather than
applied; my goal has been to establish only that a democratic conception of judicial review is a coherent and possible basis for judicial
review. But this leaves unanswered a much more fundamental issue
for Canadian constitutional scholars and jurists. Simply put, does
the democratic conception accurately reflect the essential principles
and policies underlying the Charter?This question is descriptive and
empirical as well as normative. It seeks to determine the background principles and themes of the Charter as a whole.
It would be foolish to claim that there was a single monolithic
purpose underlying all aspects of the Charter.There is no question
that the document embodies a range of competing and disparate
values, as opposed to a unitary or unique set of goals. Notwithstanding this heterogeneity, it seems to be possible and desirable to
step back from the document and to attempt to identify its overriding themes and ambitions. A key method for identifying those
themes is to compare the Charterwith the American Bill of Rights.
The Canadian drafters constantly had the American experience
before them in developing the Charter.It is thus particularly instructive to note those elements of the American constitutional experience which were incorporated into the Charter as well as those
elements which were excluded or modified.
What is the relationship between the American Constitution and
democratic values? Democratic institutions are certainly one important focus of the American Constitution, but it is difficult to regard
them as the exclusive or even the overriding theme of the document.
There are a variety of clauses which are directed towards the preservation of certain fundamental values which have little or nothing
to do with furthering democracy. In fact, far from promoting
democracy, the document seems preoccupied with drawing boundaries around the political process and preventing unruly majorities
from interfering with established rights, particularly property rights.
In the I78Os, state legislatures had passed a variety of debtor relief
laws which were widely viewed as violations of property rights. A
particular concern for federalist thought at the time was to protect
property against tyranny by the majority; the ambition was to
minimize the threat implicit in popular political power rather than
to facilitate political participation or democratic empowerment.
A central purpose of the U.S. Constitutionwas to confine political
life to the public realm, while ensuring that the state did not inter-
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fere with private rights of property or contract. This dichotomy
between public and private realms was premised on the belief that
individuals possessed a prepolitical zone of pure autonomy or freedom. The zone of pure autonomy was prepolitical in the sense that
it did not depend upon the state for its existence or legitimacy. The
boundaries of individual autonomy were defined primarily by the
institution of property, contract and the market. Within this i8th
century world view market ordering was not a form of coercion or
a system of state regulation; markets reflected the absence of regulation, a sphere in which voluntarism and freedom might flourish.
State regulation was thus characterized as the coercive control of
individuals by the collectivity. Constitutional guarantees such as the
"Contracts Clause" or the "Takings Clause" were designed to check
the potential excesses of popular rule. 1 Armed with such constitutional guarantees, the judiciary would police the boundary between
the zone of autonomy and the realm of legitimate democratic debate.
Judicial review would be one means of ensuring that the people
did not encroach on the private sphere reserved for individuals.
The drafters of the American Constitution did not rely exclusively on formal limits in order to protect the propertied minority;
they also devised a complex system of checks and balances which
would enable minorities to block popular majorities intent on violating rights. The ultimate goal was limited government, not majority
rule. Jennifer Nedelsky summarizes the mood and thrust of Federalist thought in the following terms:
The Federalists came to emphasize protection from republican
government, rather than exploring or optimizing republican principles. They accepted the widely held view that government by consent was necessary to prevent tyranny, and was required by the
imperative of natural rights and the equality of man. Moreover, they
recognized that political exigencies required that any viable political
proposal appear to comport with the popular attachment to republican principles. They thus took the principle of consent as a given,
and turned their attention to the dangers inherent in governments
based on such principles. The result was a subtle but important shift
in focus from the promise
of republican government to the contain42
ment of its threats
John Hart Ely, who claims that the American Constitution is
primarily directed towards protecting democracy rather than sub'4' Contracts Clause and Takings Clause of U.S. Constitution.
142 Nedelsky, "Private Property and the Formation of the American Constitution", (Public Law Workshop, Osgoode Hall Law School, October 1985)
at 15.
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stantive values, has some difficulty in accounting for the emphasis
on property and contract in the document. He acknowledges that
there are a number of provisions which are "value oriented", but
argues that the provisions which do not fit within his framework
are "few and far between". He believes that in order to characterize
the "value oriented" provisions as the dominant theme of the constitutional document, "one would have to concentrate quite singlemindedly on hopping from stone to stone and averting one's eyes
from the mainstream". 4 3 Thus Ely argues that the "contracts
clause", although protecting the substantive value of contractual
rights, has not played a significant role during most of the twentieth
century. As for the Fifth Amendment's requirement that private
property not be taken for public use without just compensation, Ely
interprets this as promoting democracy rather than the value of
property as such: its point is to "spread the cost of operating the
governmental apparatus throughout the society rather than imposing
it upon some small segment of it".'"
It is quite unnecessary to determine whether Ely's attempt to
marginalize the contracts clause or the takings clause are convincing in historical terms. My point is much simpler. Whatever the
precise meaning of the various clauses in the U.S. Constitution, it is
clear that eighteenth-century political assumptions about "limited
government" are today totally discredited. It has been axiomatic,
at least since the legal realists in the 192os and i93os, that the
traditional dichotomy between public and private realms is largely
illusory. There is no such thing as a zone of pure autonomy, free of
state regulation. Property, for example, is itself the creature of the
state, rather than its antithesis. The state defines those interests
which qualify as property and then intervenes to ensure that they
are protected. The same can be said of contractual rights or of
markets generally. In effect, it is simply fallacious to attempt to
"eliminate" state intervention in markets; the state is already there,
defining the entitlements and intervening to protect them. The
whole conceptual underpinnings of the eighteenth century preoccupation with limited government have been demonstrated to be false.
Thus the Canadian Charterwas drafted in an era in which the
notion of "private ordering", the very basis of the American Constitution, had lost much of its meaning. One would accordingly expect
143 Ely, supra, note 6 at Iox.
'44 Ibid. at 97, citing J. Sax, "Takings and the Police Power", (1964-65) 74
Yale L.J. 36 at 75-76.
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to observe quite significant differences between the Charter and the
American Bill of Rights. In fact, this is precisely what one does
observe. The agenda of Canadian constitutionalists in 1982 was a
far cry from that of American Federalists 200 years earlier. The
preoccupation with limited government had largely disappeared,
replaced by a concern to ensure that the Charter did not frustrate
state efforts to expand freedom and pursue the cause of social justice.
There was a recognition, in other words, of the fact that there is no
necessary tension between the state and freedom; the state can
create or enhance freedom as well as limit it. The overriding goal of
the Charter was to regulate and structure the way in which state
power could be used, rather than to define the boundary between
public and private.
This agenda is reflected first of all in what the drafters of the
Chartersought to exclude from the document. The Charterincludes
no contracts clause and no takings clause. In fact, the drafters took
the view that the Charter did not provide any protection for "economic" as opposed to "political" rights. Section 7, the Canadian
equivalent to the American due process clause, was supposed to
protect only the right to a fair procedure as opposed to an entitlement to a substantively just outcome. The drafters were emphatic
in their view that s. 7 would not entitle judges to inquire into
whether or not the outcomes of the political process were "fair".
Thus the point of s. 7 was to structure and mediate the exercise of
state power, rather than to draw artificial boundaries between
"public and "private" realms. The drafters believed that it was
inappropriate for judges to define state policy on issues of public
concern; the task of the judges was simply to ensure that the policy
chosen by Parliament was applied in a fair and even-handed fashion.
The debates over the purpose of s. 7 reflect and illuminate the
larger conception of judicial review which underlies the Charter as
a whole. This conception of judicial review is premised on a particular view of the nature of state power. For the drafters of the Charter,
state "intervention" in the supposedly private realm of property
and markets was a given. The issue was not whether the state would
intervene, but how. The corollary was that state intervention was
not necessarily "bad"; the state could enhance freedom as well as
limit it. This meant that it would be counterproductive and wrongheaded to impose a series of rigid constitutional constraints on the
policies which the state might pursue. Such constitutional constraints would be wrongheaded, since they would not necessarily
serve the cause of individual freedom. They would simply prevent
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the state from intervening in certain ways or in aid of certain substantive goals. Thus the drafters of the Charter were acutely conscious of the possible dangers inherent in constitutionalizing rights.
The prime fear was that the Charterwould mean that public policy
would be defined by a set of unelected and unaccountable judges,
rather than by Parliament. The drafters sought to guard against this
danger. They believed that Parliament would still be free to define
the agenda and the goals of public policy, even under the Charter.
The role of the courts was not to choose substantive policy, but
simply to mediate and structure the way in which state power was
applied to individual citizens.
This preoccupation with the dangers of judicial review and with
protecting the political process is not simply reflected in the discussions surrounding s. 7. There is a whole series of rather remarkable
clauses explicitly designed to limit the scope of judicial review. The
most obvious of these is s. i, the "reasonable limits" clause. In
theory at least, it was not strictly necessary to draft a separate "limitations clause" indicating that the rights guaranteed by the Charter
were not absolute. Common sense alone indicates that since rights
and freedoms inevitably collide, the rights of any one individual or
group cannot be absolutely protected. Yet the drafters of the Charter
were apparently uncomfortable with simply assuming that the
courts would necessarily read in limits to substantive rights. The
separate limitations clause reinforces the fact that the substantive
rights should not be read in an absolutist fashion and that collective
as well as individual interests must be taken into account by the
judiciary. The other message implicit in s. i is that defining the
scope of rights is not simply a matter reserved exclusively for courts
and judges. The legislature also has a legitimate role to play in
defining the appropriate balance between individual and collective
interests. Unlike Professor Dworkin's imagery of courts as the elite
"forum of principle", under the Charter matters of principle fall
within the domain of legislatures as well as courts.
Sections 6(4) and 15(2) of the Charter reflect the notion that
state intervention can enhance freedom and that judicial review
should not be allowed to frustrate such state efforts. Section 6(4)
provides that mobility rights shall not preclude a law designed to
ameliorate conditions of socially or economically disadvantaged individuals in a province "if the rate of employment in that province is
below the rate of employment in Canada". Section 15 (2) provides
that equality rights shall not preclude any "law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged
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individuals or groups." These sections are merely particular illustrations of the more general point made earlier: constitutional limits
on the state do not necessarily enhance freedom. If the Charter
were interpreted so as to preclude so-called "affirmative action"
programs, the effect would be to deprive disadvantaged groups of
the benefit of those programs. In short, constitutional limits on state
power operate in a zero-sum fashion, expanding the freedom of some
individuals while at the same time limiting the freedom of others.
Sections 6(4) and 15(2) are designed to limit the scope of judicial
review and preserve the ability of the state to act in the interests of
socially and economically disadvantaged Canadians.
These same sentiments underlie s. 33, the override provision,
which gives the legislature the final say on most rights issues. The
existence of s. 33 is not an indication that the rights guaranteed by
the Charter are somehow unimportant or trivial. Rather, s. 33
reflects a fear that judicial review can be used to frustrate or unduly
constrict state policy. By giving the final say on most Charterissues
to the legislature, s. 33 is an attempt to prevent the courts from
unnecessarily restricting the ability of the legislature to enhance
freedom. It is a recognition of the fact that rights issues are not
matters reserved exclusively for the courts, but are appropriate
subjects for collective deliberation and debate. It is also a signal to
the courts that if they fail to heed the caution signs displayed
prominently elsewhere in the Charter,the legislature will step in to
overturn their decisions.
What all of this suggests is that the vision of judicial review
embodied in the Charteris radically different from that contained
in the U.S. Constitution. Unlike the American Constitution, the
Charteris not designed to insulate zones of "privacy" or "autonomy"
from the intervention of the political process. By the i98os it has
become self evident that the classic dichotomy between public and
private is largely illusory and that there is no such thing as a zone
of "pure autonomy". Thus property rights and contract rights,
which were the cornerstone of private ordering in eighteenthcentury Federalist thinking, play no role in the Charter.Further, the
drafters refused to constitutionalize a right to "privacy", which has
supplanted property as a conceptual basis for private ordering in
contemporary American doctrine. The Charter is designed to
mediate the exercise of state power, not to draw boundaries around
it. The attempt to mediate state power takes a number of specific
forms. First, there is the concern with preserving the basic infrastructure of democracy -elections, free speech and rights of asso-
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ciation. Second, there is a concern that laws not be applied in a

discriminatory fashion. The legislature is not under an obligaton to
provide any particular service or program, but if it elects to provide
the service or program for some citizens but not ohers, it must offer
some justification for the choice it made. Third, when the state interferes directly with the liberty of an individual, it must act in accordance with a detailed set of procedural norms. These procedural
protections reflect the fact that the state possesses an overwhelming
advantage over individuals in terms of resources and expertise. The
various guarantees in ss. 7-14 of the Charter are an attempt to
moderate and equalize the power relationship between state and
individual.
This emphasis on mediating state power is by no means the only
purpose embodied in the Charter.The major exception to my analysis of the document is ss. 16-23, the language rights sections. These
guarantees stand apart from the rest of the Charter. They are an
explicit attempt to constitutionalize a particular social value, rather
than simply structure and mediate the exercise of state power. Thus,
it would be quite misleading to characterize the language rights as
a mere elaboration of the idea of democracy. At the same time, the
presence of this distinctive set of constitutional entitlements tends
to confirm rather than contradict my readings of the Charter as a
whole. The language rights are clearly special and stand apart from
the remainder of the Charter. For one thing, these rights are not
subject to the legislative override in s. 33. Further, they deal with
the rights of groups rather than individuals and are only triggered
in certain defined circumstances [i.e., the "where numbers warrant"
criteria in s. 23]. The Supreme Court, in its first extended discussion
of the nature of language rights, has emphasized their distinctive
character. In La Societi Des Acadiens Du Nouveau-Brunswick Inc.
v. Association of Parents for Fairness in Education,4 5 Mr. Justice
Beetz argued that language rights are a product of "political compromise" rather than "principle" and that they lack the universality
and generality of other rights in the Charter. I prefer to describe
the difference between the language rights and the remainder of
the Charter in slightly different terms; in my opinion, the distinguishing feature of the language rights is their attempt to constitutionalize a particular set of political outcomes. For purposes of
the present discussion, however, the crucial point is that the language rights tend to illuminate and sharpen the shape of the remain45 Societi des Acadiens, supra, note x3.
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der of the Charter. Because the language rights are intuitively
different from the Charter as a whole, they help to bring the background purposes and principles of the document into bolder relief.
Ultimately, then, my claim is not that there is a single purpose
underlying the Charter.I do believe, however, that there are certain
broad themes and assumptions which underlie the document as a
whole. These background principles are sufficiently abstract that
they do not constitute a recipe book in which one can "look up" the
correct answers to particular Charter cases. But they do exert what
Dworkin has termed a "gravitational pull", cutting in favour of
certain arguments and cutting against others. In the next section, I
offer particular illustrations of the practical bite of this way of
understanding the Charter.
D. Applications
The practical utility, as well as the limitations, of the argument
are best illustrated by consideration of a number of concrete
examples. Take first the vexing question of government attempts to
regulate the amount of money that can be spent by candidates or
individuals in election campaigns. In both Canada and the United
States, the state has taken steps to insulate the electoral process from
the effects of money. In both jurisdictions, the courts have interpreted constitutional guarantees of free speech so as to prohibit or
to limit the regulation of campaign finance. In the United States,
the Supreme Court struck down attempts by Congress to limit the
amount of money which could be spent by a candidate or by an
individual on the candidate's behalf. 46 In Canada, a provision in
the CanadaElections Act, 47 which prohibited "third party" advertising during an election campaign was ruled invalid due to the
guarantee of freedom of expression in s. 2 of the Charter.4
The reasoning of the American Court was that campaign expenditures constituted speech "at the core of the first Amendment". The
only "compelling" reason justifying government restriction of such
speech was to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption in
the political process. Since the expenditure of money merely expressed an opinion and did not raise the spectre of corruption,
attempts to regulate such expenditures were unconstitutional.
424 U.S. z.
R.S.C. 1970, c. 14 (St supp.).
148 See National Citizens Coalition Inc. v. Attorney General of Canada ['984]
5 W.W.R. 436 (Alta. Q.B.).
146 Buckley v. Valeo (1976)
1-17
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The approach of the Canadian Court in the National Citizens
Coalition case was far less categorical. The government apparently
made no attempt to justify the limits on third party spending on the
basis of a fear of corruption. The government's primary justification
for the legislation was the need to ensure a level of equality amongst
all participants in federal elections. It was argued that since parties
and candidates are subject to spending limits, the absence of spending limits on third parties would give an unfair advantage to wealthy
interest groups. Mr. Justice Medhurst did not indicate whether this
principle of equality was a legitimate government objective. His
Lordship added that the Court could not consider whether there
may have been other, less restrictive means available to achieve the
objective. This would be rewriting the legislation, which was a
political as opposed to a legal task. Medhurst J. based his finding of
invalidity on the simple fact that there should be "actual demonstration of harm or a real likelihood of harm to a society value before
a limitation can be said to be justified". In this instance, the government had advanced nothing more than "fears or concerns of mischief that may occur", and this evidence was insufficient to justify
the limitation on rights of expression.149 This analysis, although
dealing only with the narrow question of third party spending, is an
implied attack on the regulation of expenditures by candidates as
well. It is hard to see how the government could demonstrate that
there was any more "actual harm" from candidates' expenditures as
opposed to expenditures by third parties.
How might a "process-based" theory along the lines I propose
deal with the issue of election campaign finance? The first point to
note is that the theory does not necessarily "demand" or "require'
a particular result. But in general terms, I would be far more sympathetic to campaign finance regulation than either the Canadian or
the American courts have been. If we begin with the proposition
that freedom is not simply the absence of restraint, it becomes possible to conceive of the regulation of campaign finance as enhancing
freedom rather than limiting it. The point of the legislation is to
restrict the ability of certain wealthy groups or interests to dominate
election campaigns through the expenditure of money. The legislation is designed to ensure that no one political perspective is permitted to drown out the competing messages in the electoral marketplace. This justification becomes convincing once you push beyond
149 Ibid. at 448 and 453.
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questions of formal access and negative freedom and focus instead
on issues of equality of access and positive freedom.
Basic democratic values suggest that government attempts to
improve equal access is an objective that is weighty or "compelling".
Far from mandating that certain factions or interests be permitted
to dominate the political process, democracy implies that such radical inequality subverts the proper working of the process. If this
assumption is accepted, the question then becomes an instrumental
one of matching means to ends; has the government pursued its
objective in a way that does not unnecessarily compromise other
important societal values? One need not use a sledgehammer to kill
a fly. This is one way of construing Mr. Justice Medhurst's statement that the government could not justify its legislation on the
basis of "concerns of mischief which may occur". The implication
seems to be that, given the limited amount of third party spending
in the past, there was no need for the government to impose an
absolute prohibition on all spending. The government could have
achieved its objective through a more finely tuned regulation, such
as the previous legislation which had permitted a "good faith"
defence."'
Mr. Justice Medhurst claims that he is not engaging in any such
instrumental analysis of matching means to ends. But once the basic
governmental objective of equality in the electoral marketplace is
accepted as legitimate, the only remaining issue is whether the
government could have achieved this objective using a less restrictive means. This is indeed a "political" or normative analysis, as
Medhurst J. recognizes. But it has long been a commonplace feature
of constitutional adjudication in the United States and the same
will necessarily be so in Canada.
The analysis advanced here does not yield a "right" answer to
the constitutional issue. But it does suggest that the American
approach, with its narrow focus on "corruption" as a justification for
campaign finance regulation, ought not be followed. The analysis
of the American courts is predicated on a wholly negative view of
freedom, with no recognition of the fact that the legislation is de1-0 The specific restriction considered in the case had been an amendment to
the Act, enacted in 1983. It had abolished a 'good faith' exception which
had existed in the legislation. The exception provided that a defence could
be claimed by third parties if they could establish that their expenditures
were incurred with respect to an issue of public policy, and had not been
incurred in collusion with a party or candidate for the purpose of defeating
provisions on spending restrictions. For a short history of the legislation, see
the judgment of Medhurst J. ibid. at 442-46.
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signed to enhance positive freedom and effective access to the political arena. Constitutional argument should be limited to the narrow
issue of whether the means chosen by the government to achieve
this important objective is unduly restrictive of other social values.
Let me offer a second, related illustration of the application of
this general approach to judicial review. In the Oakes case, the
Supreme Court of Canada set out a framework of analysis for the
application of s. i of the Charter.In an earlier part of this paper, I
pointed out that the second branch of the test proposed by Chief
Justice Dickson -

the "proportionality test"

-required

courts to

make substantive value choices. The point of that critique was to
emphasize that Charter analysis is not neutral or apolitical and that
courts will inevitably have to make some assessment of the "wisdom"
of legislative choices.
The fact that the proportionality test requires political choices by
courts does not necessarily mean it ought to be abandoned. The
inescapable reality of the Charter era is that courts will inevitably
be forced into making choices that are overly political. Even the
decision not to hear a case is itself a political choice as I pointed out
in my discussion of the Operation Dismantle case. The question is
not whether or not political choices will be made by courts but the
manner in which those choices are to be made.
Viewed against this backdrop, there are certain obvious attractions to the proportionality test proposed by Chief Justice Dickson
in the Oakes case. The test does require an assessment of the goals
underlying legislation, but this assessment is more constrained and
focused than it would be under the first branch of the test in Oakes.
The first branch of Oakes simply asks courts to assess the "importance" of the government's policy goal. In contrast, the proportionality test measures means and ends at the margin. The starting
point of the analysis is the particular regulatory framework chosen
by the legislature. The analysis then attempts to assess the costs and
benefits of alternative regulatory instruments which could have been
employed to achieve the state's goal. The analysis is necessarily
empirical and pragmatic, measuring the effects and the costs of the
various alternatives against their stated goals.
The obvious objection to this type of empirical, means-ends
analysis is that courts are ill-equipped to make such complex factual
and normative judgments. But the answer to the objection is quite
simple. Courts under the Charter cannot avoid making complex
factual and normative judgments about legislation. The real question is not whether they will make such judgments at all, but
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rather whether they will do so in an empirical vacuum. Notwithstanding the well-known institutional limitations of courts, they are
better off attempting to assess the relationship between the means
and the ends of laws on the basis of evidence and argument as
opposed to mere intuition.
The general theory of judicial review proposed in this paper suggests that the second branch of the Oakes test should be emphasized
while the first branch of the test should be downplayed. The process
of forcing legislatures to justify the fit between means and ends is
not necessarily incompatible with democracy. The virtue of the exercise is that it forces the legislature to re-examine its legislation in
order to ensure that these laws really achieve their intended purposes.
One of the initial and continuing benefits of the Charteris that it
forces all levels of government in Canada to undertake a comprehensive review of existing regulation in order to ensure compliance
with the Charter. Far from subverting democracy this process has
the potential to enhance it. It forces the political branches to reevaluate the tradeoffs involved in regulation and to ask whether the
benefits of a law truly outweigh its costs.
V. CONCLUSION: COMING TO TERMS WITH
THE CHARTER
In closing, I want to briefly consider two objections which might
be raised against the general theory of judicial review proposed in
this paper. The first objection is a wholesale rejection of the utility
or necessity of the enterprise of "high theory" itself. According to
this objection, general theories of judicial review are of relatively
little practical relevance. They do not determine results in particular
cases. As such, they are purely academic exercises with marginal
significance for the "real world" of constitutional litigation.
The observation that general theories of judicial review do not
"demand" a unique set of results is unassailable. But this does not
mean that high theory is irrelevant to the litigation process. All
constitutional decisions depend upon a set of controversial assumptions about the nature of rights and of democracy. The distinction
is not between decisions which depend on a general theory and
those which do not, but between those cases in which the theory is
made explicit and those in which it remains implicit. This has been
clearly illustrated by the early Supreme Court cases under the
Charter.Although the Court did not purport to elaborate a general
theory of individual rights, decisions such as Operation Dismantle
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were shown to rest on a controversial set of assumptions about the
nature of freedom. Unless these assumptions are made explicit, their
highly contestable nature remains latent. Decisions which are the
product of a whole series of debatable value choices take on an
appearance of neutrality and inevitability. By engaging in an explicit
discussion of high theory, this appearance of inevitability can be
exploded. It becomes possible to criticize the actual judicial choices
that are being made and to imagine a set of alternative constitutional outcomes.
There is a second, more modest objection to the enterprise of
constructing a general theory of judicial review. This objection flows
from the presence of the "legislative override" in s. 33 of the
Charter.On this view, it is unnecessary to offer a general theory to
justify or explain judicial review because the judiciary does not
have the last word on rights issues. If the legislature disagrees with
the choices made by the judiciary, it can simply pass legislation
which will operate notwithstanding the Charter.
There are problems with this view. First, we do not yet know the
extent to which it will be politically feasible for legislatures to make
use of the override provision. Second, the use of the override is itself
subject to the possibility of judicial review. Significantly, on the one
occasion in which a legislature has made use of the override, a court
has ruled the measure to be contrary to the terms of s. 33. Finally,
as I argued earlier, the presence of the override is itself consistent
with the theory of judicial review I put forward in this paper.
The purpose of the theory is less to legitimate judicial review
than to come to terms with it. Many Canadian lawyers continue to
have serious doubts about the inherent desirability of constitutionalizing a set of fundamental rights. There can be no doubt that these
principled concerns are weighty and fundamental. But the Charter
is now the pervasive phenomenon of legal life in this country, in
both elite and popular circles. The time for lamenting the enactment
of the Charter is past. The issue now is the path which judicial
review will pursue and the interests it will serve. This essay is
premised on the belief that the choices that our legal culture will
make and the interests it will favour are not preordained by fate or
the "objective conditions" of history. We can experience this sense
of possibility and empowerment only when we take seriously the
Charterand the choices it offers for Canadian law.
151 Alliance des Professeurs de Montreal v. Attorney General of Quebec (1985)
21 D.L.R. (4th) 354 (Que. C.A.).

